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Abstract  
 
Risk is central in the study of rural development. To cope with risk, smallholder 
farmers rely on a range of formal and informal insurance mechanisms: an extensive 
literature has explored their interactions. Yet, our understanding of the implications of 
these interactions for smallholder farmers’ decision-making is incomplete. This thesis 
addresses this scholarly gap by shedding new light on the risk-related decisions of 
smallholder farmers and the mechanisms through which networks affect these decisions. 
To do so, it relies on a combination of experimental and non-experimental economic 
analyses. The first chapter draws on a framed field experiment in Gujarat, India to 
explore the effect of selling weather index insurance to groups (as opposed to 
individuals) on the investment decisions of the insured. The analysis reveals that group 
pressure reduces risk taking among individuals with group insurance in contexts with 
perfect information about peer investment decisions. Group insurance thus suffers from 
the same potential pitfall as group microcredit. The second chapter examines the extent 
to which informal transfers can explain take-up of individual weather index insurance. 
It aims to disentangle two channels through which informal transfers influence decisions 
to purchase insurance: (i) informal risk sharing and (ii) moral hazard. As in the first 
chapter, the study draws on a framed field experiment in Gujarat. The main finding of 
this experiment is that redistribution norms reduce take-up: moral hazard leads to 
lower levels of insurance coverage. The final chapter builds on these results with a non-
experimental analysis of panel data from a rural household survey in India. It examines 
how cultural obligations to redistribute within networks affect investments in self-
protection. The empirical evidence suggests that increases in individual income lead to 
higher investments, but increases in network income lead to lower investments due to 
moral hazard. Collectively, the three papers nuance our understanding of how 
redistribution norms affect the risk-related decisions of the rural poor. While not 
negating their consumption smoothing benefits, this thesis indicates that networks also 
affect decision-making via group pressure and moral hazard. Such externalities could be 
forestalled by targeting insurance in rural areas with weaker redistributive norms or 
modifying insurance policy designs. Further research on the welfare implications of such 
approaches is thus recommended. 
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Introduction  
 
Risk is a central concern for the rural poor. A key risk for rural households is 
agricultural yield volatility induced by shocks such as pests and rainfall variability. 
Climate change has brought the latter under the spotlight of policymakers and scholars: 
increasingly severe and varied weather conditions such as flood and drought leave the 
rural poor more and more vulnerable (IPCC, 2012). This puts a premium on risk 
mitigation as central to improving rural livelihoods in the developing world.  
 
To cope with production risks such as rainfall variability, smallholder farmers rely on a 
range of risk mitigation tools. Within networks characterised by redistribution norms, 
one such tool is informal transfers. Often defined as gifts or loans, these informal 
monetary exchanges act as a form of informal insurance to smooth consumption during 
periods of financial hardship. Such transfers are widely recognised as frequent and 
central to financial security in developing countries (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). Their 
important function as a safety net for the rural poor is clear. Yet, many scholarly works 
have failed to capture other potential externalities of such transfers for rural 
development. This thesis sheds light on several less well explored implications of 
informal transfers in a series of three essays. Essay 1 shows, via a framed field 
experiment, that selling insurance to groups – as opposed to individuals – reduces risk 
taking in other aspects of agricultural production due to group pressure; Essay 2 reveals 
in a second framed field experiment that networks reduce insurance coverage due to 
moral hazard via informal transfers; and Essay 3 draws on a non-experimental analysis 
to illustrate that moral hazard also limits adoption of self-protection tools. 
 
All of the essays focus on rural India. Home to 33% of the world’s poor, India is a 
central case in the study of rural development. Despite impressive growth rates in 
recent years, the benefits of this growth have not sufficiently trickled down to the rural 
poor: more than 47% of Indians work in the agriculture sector and 26% of rural Indians 
still live below the poverty line (World Bank, 2012).  
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Essay 1 first explores potential externalities of group dynamics in the case of weather 
index insurance - a microinsurance1 product designed to mitigate the risk of rainfall 
variation. Purchasing a weather insurance policy entitles the owner to a payout if 
rainfall levels fall above or below a certain range at a nearby rainfall station during the 
monsoon season. Despite its consumption smoothing benefits during shocks, however, 
weather insurance take-up remains low (e.g. Cole et al., 2013; Gine, Townsend & 
Vickery, 2008).  
 
Recognition of take-up and transaction cost challenges across a range of individual 
microinsurance products has led to a surge of interest in group microinsurance. Yet, few 
studies have considered the effect of the group structure on the investment decisions of 
the insured. In the case of weather insurance, this is an important omission. Essay 1 
suggests that group insurance decreases risk taking in other aspects of agricultural 
production when groups internally manage insurance payout distribution and have 
perfect information about peer investment decisions. This reduction in risk taking arises 
because the group structure relaxes the clearly delineated ownership of insurance 
payouts that characterises individual policies. The group structure also formalises 
informal risk sharing by facilitating groups to award larger proportions of the group 
payout to peers with higher losses. For fear that risk-takers will demand higher 
proportions of the group payout in such an environment, groups pressure peers to take 
on less risk when investment decisions are public.  
 
These findings are drawn from a framed field experiment in Gujarat, India. The 
experimental results indicate that group pressure leads to an 8% reduction in risk 
taking in contexts with perfect information and group insurance (relative to individual 
insurance). Group insurance thus suffers from the same potential pitfall as group 
microcredit (Fischer, 2013). As higher risk taking can lead to higher average 
                                                     
1 Microinsurance is insurance for individuals without access to commercial and social insurance 
schemes (ILO, 2006). Similar to ordinary insurance, microinsurance products pool risk across 
individuals in order to reimburse individuals for a loss incurred due to an unpredictable event.  
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agricultural productivity – and thus, development (e.g. Duflo, Kremer & Robinson, 
2008) – these findings of group pressure are a cause for concern. This research thus 
underscores the importance of greater attention to group selection, the information 
environment and the regulation of payout distribution in structuring insurance 
products. 
 
Essay 2 explores a second potential interaction between informal transfers and weather 
insurance. In particular, this study aims to disentangle two channels through which 
informal transfers influence decisions to purchase individual weather insurance: (i) 
moral hazard and (ii) informal risk sharing. These channels are explored using the 
Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) model to elicit willingness to pay (WTP) for weather 
insurance in a second framed field experiment in Gujarat. The core result from this 
experiment is that moral hazard reduces weather insurance take-up. When farmers 
know they are allowed to give and receive transfers after a shock has occurred, many 
decide not to purchase insurance. On the whole, I find movement on the extensive 
margin. Allowing informal transfers leads to a 14% increase in the number of people 
who are not willing to pay any price for insurance. Decreases in WTP are also 
pronounced among poorer individuals. Assuming expected utility preferences, these 
results are consistent with a model of moral hazard but not with a model of optimal 
risk sharing. The scholarly conclusion of these results is clear: while networks offer 
consumption smoothing benefits, they also lead to lower insurance coverage. 
 
The first two essays both underscore the implications of networks for decision-making in 
the context of formal insurance. The final essay complements these insights in an 
examination of how cultural norms to redistribute within networks affect decisions to 
utilise self-protection tools (i.e. risk-reducing investments). A range of traditional, low-
cost self-protection techniques such as levelling and bunding can reduce the risks 
associated with agricultural production. Yet, similar to weather insurance, take-up of 
these practices remains low among smallholder farmers. Determining optimal usage 
levels is, of course, thorny: there are multiple alternative tools available and farmer 
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production functions and utility functions are unknown. Low take-up, however, does 
raise the question as to why many farmers do not adopt such practices and whether 
rural livelihoods could be improved through their greater usage. Akin to the second 
essay, the third essay seeks to resolve this conundrum by exploring the extent to which 
redistribution norms can explain investments in self-protection tools.  
 
The main finding of this study is that moral hazard in the caste network reduces self-
protection investments in rural India. These results emerge from a non-experimental 
analysis of panel data from the National Council of Applied Economic Research Rural 
Economic and Demographic Survey (NCAER REDS). This national rural household 
survey in 1982 and 1999 offers a unique opportunity to test the prediction that 
household and network income induce opposing effects on self-protection. Using a panel 
dataset, I am able to sidestep endogeneity concerns such as time-invariant 
unobservables by focusing on within-household changes in income and self-protection. I 
also implement an instrumental variable strategy by instrumenting for changes in 
income with inherited land in 1982 to address potential biases from time-variant 
unobservables and reverse causality. The empirical evidence supports the prediction 
that redistributive norms within the caste network induce a moral hazard problem. 
While increases in individual income lead to higher self-protection levels, increases in 
average caste income lead to lower self-protection levels. 
 
Overall, this thesis challenges scholarly convictions about the role of networks for the 
rural poor. While not negating their consumption smoothing benefits, it contributes to a 
more comprehensive picture of networks by shedding light on additional channels 
through which they affect risk-related decisions. Depending on contextual factors such 
as the information environment, this research suggests that networks lead to lower risk 
taking due to group pressure, as well as lower insurance take-up and investments in 
self-protection due to moral hazard. Thus, the thesis provides a more well-rounded and 
nuanced picture of the role of networks in rural development.  
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This contribution is grounded in three empirical innovations in the study of networks, 
risk mitigation and investment decisions. First, this thesis lays new ground by directly 
comparing the effect of structuring weather insurance as a group - versus individual - 
product for the ex-post investment decisions of the insured. Second, it is the first study 
to uncover evidence of moral hazard in weather insurance take-up. And third, this 
thesis is the first to extend the study of moral hazard to investment in self-protection 
tools in India.  
 
Beyond its theoretical and empirical innovations, several policy implications arise from 
this body of work. Most importantly, this thesis qualifies prior enthusiasm about group 
insurance. With group pressure to make low-risk investments, group structures are 
unlikely to be a panacea in their proposed form. Self-selection of groups is one potential 
direction identified for future research on reducing group pressure. A second policy 
implication of this research is that insurance take-up in rural markets will be more 
successful in geographic areas with weaker redistributive norms. In contexts with 
stronger norms, policy regulations such as mandating all-or-none group sales may help 
overcome moral hazard propensities (though this should be weighed against other 
implications of such a product structure). Increasing formal coverage through all-or-
none policies or access to formal credit may also help to compensate for low adoption of 
self-protection tools. 
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Essay 1: Insurance structure, risk sharing and investment decisions: an 
empirical investigation of the implications of individual and group weather 
index insurance 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The welfare of most low-income agrarian households in developing countries is 
constrained by risk (Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto & Udry, 2014; Townsend, 1995).2 While 
informal insurance mechanisms to cope with such risks are prevalent, they are 
insufficient in the face of aggregate-level shocks (Deaton, 1992; Townsend, 1994; 
Mazzocco & Saini, 2012). Yet, take-up of formal insurance is varied. Many suggest that 
selling formal insurance to groups could further strengthen the effectiveness of both 
informal and formal insurance mechanisms (e.g., Cole et al., 2013; Dercon, Vargas Hill, 
Clarke, Outes-Leon, & Taffesse, 2014; Clarke et al., 2012; Clarke, 2011). However, an 
important unknown is whether group dynamics may generate externalities in such a 
context. This study contributes to our understanding of one such externality in a 
framed field experiment. Consistent with a simple conceptual framework, this 
experiment shows that selling insurance to groups (vs. individuals) leads to changes in 
farmers’ risk-related decisions depending on the information environment and the risk 
composition of the group.  
 
To explore these interactions between insurance structure and farmer decision-making, 
this study focuses on the case of weather insurance. A number of recent studies suggest 
that weather insurance can help smallholder farmers to better cope with risk by 
smoothing consumption and increasing average agricultural productivity. This 
microinsurance product disburses payouts contingent upon high or low rainfall levels 
                                                     
2 Some even assert the poor are stuck in risk-induced poverty traps: they can only afford to 
pursue low risk, low return opportunities (e.g., Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1993; Dercon & 
Christiaensen, 2011, Fafchamps, 1992). For instance, farmers (i) curb input levels to limit losses 
in the event of a poor harvest; (ii) diversify their employment activities, stunting opportunities 
to specialise and foster comparative advantages; or (iii) plant weather-resistant crops with lower 
profit margins (in lieu of riskier crops with higher average returns) (Gine et al., 2008; Dercon & 
Christiaensen, 2011; Cole et al., 2010). 
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measured at local rainfall stations. When risk exposure is reduced through the purchase 
of such a product, smallholder farmers tend to take on greater risk through other 
investments, for example in their choice of crops, seeds and fertiliser (Hill & Viceisza, 
2012; Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2013; Galarza & Carter, 2008).3 As riskier inputs are 
associated with higher average yields, weather insurance could thus offer an important 
contribution to rural development. However, the productivity-enhancing role of this 
financial product has been strongly curtailed by its low take-up levels (e.g., Cole et al., 
2013; Gine, Menand, Townsend & Vickery, 2010).  
 
Recent research has suggested that structuring weather insurance as a group product 
may be the panacea to take-up challenges (e.g., Cole et al., 2013; Dercon et al., 2014; 
Clarke et al., 2012; Clarke, 2011). Selling to groups has been shown to increase take-up 
of other microinsurance products through mechanisms such as social learning, lower 
training and marketing costs and lower transaction costs (de Nicola & Hill, 2011; 
Janssens & Kramer, 2013). Similar to microcredit, group insurance also addresses 
adverse selection issues and moral hazard problems. Moreover, in the case of weather 
insurance, it has been argued that the group structure would increase take-up by 
reducing basis risk, i.e. the imperfect correlation between insurance payouts 
(determined by aggregated data from local rainfall stations) and losses incurred on 
individual plots.4 As index insurance with basis risk is enhanced by informal risk 
sharing to cover idiosyncratic shocks (Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2013), it has been 
proposed that the complementarity of formal and informal risk sharing could be 
strengthened through internal control over group payouts (de Janvry, Dequiedt & 
Sadoulet, 2014).5 Existing research fails to consider, however, that the group structure 
and internal payout distribution may affect farmers in other ways as well. 
 
                                                     
3 Similar patterns are found with other forms of agricultural insurance as well (e.g. sow insurance 
in Cai, Chen, Fang & Zhou (2009) and crop price insurance in Karlan, Kutsoati, McMillan & 
Udry (2010). 
4 Basis risk is a significant impediment to take-up of formal weather insurance (Clarke, 2011). 
5 Proposals to launch group weather insurance in India and Ethiopia include this design feature. 
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Drawing on insights from the microcredit and insurance literatures, the aim of this 
study is to explore one such effect, namely the implications of group versus individual 
insurance for the investment decisions farmers make once insured, i.e. their ex-post 
investment decisions. To this effect, I develop a conceptual framework that deductively 
identifies two juxtaposed effects of the group structure on ex-post investment decisions: 
(i) higher risk taking due to moral hazard and (ii) lower risk taking due to group 
pressure. Similar to patterns in microcredit, which of these forces prevails first depends 
on the information environment.  
 
My first prediction is that investment decisions are riskier under group insurance with 
imperfect information compared with individual insurance with perfect information 
(Table 1.1). This stems from the finding in microcredit that moral hazard increases in 
joint liability loans because group members can hide investment decisions from their 
peers under imperfect information (e.g., Stiglitz, 1990; Armendariz de Aghion & 
Morduch, 2005). As an individual insurance policy is formally sold to an individual, 
ownership of the insurance payout is clearly and formally delineated. In group 
insurance, on the other hand, allowing the group to internally distribute the payout 
blurs the ownership lines and increases the size of the pot earmarked for sharing. If 
individuals can legitimately claim ownership over different proportions of the group 
payout according to losses, the opportunity for moral hazard increases relative to under 
individual insurance. 
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Table 1.1 Risk taking relative to individual insurance with perfect 
information 
 
 Individual Insurance Group Insurance 
Perfect 
Information 
 
 
Imperfect 
Information 
-  
 
Under perfect information, on the other hand, my second prediction is that group 
pressure outweighs moral hazard: investment decisions thus become less risky under 
group insurance with perfect information compared to individual insurance with perfect 
information (Table 1.1). This reduction in risk taking due to group pressure is 
consistent with the microcredit literature (e.g., Fischer, 2013; Banerjee, Besley & 
Guinnane, 1994). Groups feel socially obligated to share the cost of crop failure 
(through higher insurance payouts), though they do not reap the benefits when risk 
taking farmers achieve successful yields. If groups distribute the insurance payout as a 
function of both individual income and investment decisions, they curb peer risk taking 
by penalizing risky investments through lower insurance payouts to the higher-risk 
taking members. 
 
In addition to the information environment, this study highlights a second factor that 
contributes to these interactions between insurance structure and investment decisions: 
the risk composition of the group. Intuitively, if farmers have the same risk preferences, 
they should have comparable investment preferences and thus limited tension about 
peer decisions. With heterogeneous risk preferences, on the other hand, diverse 
investment preferences are more likely to arise. Heterogeneous preferences may thus 
lead to moral hazard and group pressure.  
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To quantify the effects of moral hazard and group pressure on investment decisions, I 
conducted a field experiment with a sample of 329 smallholder farmers in Gujarat, 
India. Reliance on an experimental approach was motivated by its ability to overcome 
two key challenges in empirical explorations of this topic: (i) few instances of group 
weather insurance currently exist in practice; and (ii) it is seldom possible to identify 
exogenous variation in insurance coverage. This experiment is structured as a series of 
Kharif6 season simulations in which income is dependent on a fertiliser decision and a 
stochastic weather draw. Three different treatments with hypothetical insurance are 
randomly assigned across the sample: (i) individual insurance with perfect information 
about peer investment decisions (Individual Perfect); (ii) group insurance with perfect 
information about peer investment decisions (Group Perfect); and (iii) group insurance 
with imperfect information about peer investment decisions (Group Imperfect).  
 
This benchmark experiment yields two overarching empirical results for the case of 
externally organised weather insurance groups. 7  First, in line with the conceptual 
framework’s predictions, group pressure outweighs the effects of moral hazard and leads 
to an 8% reduction in risk taking in contexts with perfect information and group 
insurance (relative to individual insurance). Based on back of the envelope calculations, 
this sizeable reduction translates to an average 107 rupee (Rs) reduction in earnings per 
acre in this experiment. As the income range was limited due to constraints in the 
experimental design, this can be interpreted as a conservative estimate of the income 
effect in practice. In view of Duflo et al.’s (2008) finding that returns to fertiliser – a 
risky investment – range from 36 to 257%, an 8% reduction in risk taking could 
significantly constrain yields. This first finding is thus concerning from a development 
perspective. The second main result of this study is that these average effects interact 
with risk preferences. In particular, more risk averse individuals are found to take less 
risk in contexts with group insurance and imperfect information (relative to individual 
                                                     
6 Kharif season is the summer planting period in South Asia (typically, June to October). 
7 in the context in which I operate, which aims to closely replicate reality. 
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insurance with perfect information). This could be due to concern about the quality of 
informal insurance in contexts with imperfect information. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study is the first – to 
my knowledge – to empirically identify the relationship between insurance structure and 
ex-post investment decisions for the case of group weather insurance. Second, this 
research highlights the importance of – and points to the need for further research on – 
the information environment and group composition for disentangling the heterogeneous 
effects of this relationship. In order to better design and target insurance, further 
consideration should be given to these contextual factors. 
 
In terms of policy implications, this study cautions against the uniform application of 
group insurance barring further research on the context under which group pressure 
arises. One potential avenue for mitigating group pressure may be variation in group 
formation mechanisms. This study has focused on the case of externally-organised 
weather insurance groups with diverse risk preferences. As individuals are more likely to 
risk share among peers with similar risk attitudes (Ghatak, 2000), one possible solution 
to group pressure may be to allow self-selection of groups. Extending this work to the 
study of self-selected groups or varying the combination of risk preferences within 
groups would thus be an interesting direction for further research. 
  
The rest of this essay is organised as follows. First, I review the literature and detail the 
conceptual framework. Then, I discuss the experimental protocols and implementation 
strategy. Next, I present the empirical strategy and results. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of academic and policy implications. 
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1.2 Related literature and theoretical motivation 
 
To motivate further study of the implications of the group structure for ex-post 
investment decisions, this section first reviews relevant insights from the literatures on: 
(i) microcredit and information sharing and (ii) insurance and information sharing. It 
then presents the structure of a simple conceptual framework in which farmers facing 
rainfall risk must each choose among investment products with varying levels of risk 
and return. By comparing expected payoffs and variations in risk, this framework 
outlines the intuition behind why the information environment differentially affects 
investment decisions across individual weather insurance and group weather insurance. 
 
1.2.1 Related literature 
 
Varying effects of group insurance first draw on the microcredit and information 
sharing literature. Many scholars have identified the problem of moral hazard - risk 
taking above first-best optimal levels - in group lending. When borrowers are jointly 
liable for a loan, the inability of one borrower to make loan payments means that the 
rest of the group must cover these payments to prevent a group default. The level of 
information sharing about peer investment decisions plays an important role here: 
imperfect information incentivises moral hazard by hiding risk taking above first best. 
Some studies even suggest that this phenomenon depends on risk preferences: in 
particular, less risk averse individuals choose significantly riskier investments when they 
can hide such decisions from peers in a joint liability loan (Fischer, 2013).   
 
To solve the moral hazard problem, microcredit scholars have pointed to peer 
monitoring (e.g., Stiglitz, 1990; Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Conning, 
2005; Chowdury, 2005). In contexts with perfect information, peer monitoring allows 
groups to hold individuals accountable for their investment decisions. The effect of peer 
monitoring, however, often goes beyond curbing moral hazard. A few studies suggest 
that peer monitoring reduces risk taking below socially optimal levels through group 
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pressure (Fischer, 2013; Banerjee, Besley & Guinnane, 1994).8 Perfect information about 
peer decisions and, in particular, project approval rights by peers, discourages risky 
investments. Fischer (2013) suggests this pressure helps to explain stunted growth in 
microbusinesses: groups cover the cost of peer failure but do not reap a share of the 
benefits when peer investments succeed. This disparity incentivises groups to discourage 
risk taking in peer businesses – a finding that is also consistent with the sociology 
literature on the role of social pressure in cooperation (e.g. Simmel, 1950; Coleman, 
1988; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950).  
 
The insurance literature also provides an important foundation for exploring 
interactions between insurance, the information environment and decision-making (e.g., 
Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976; Cutler & Reber, 1998; Kinnan, 2014). A 
substantial literature has focused specifically on insurance in the agricultural sector: 
crop insurance, for instance, is widely recognised for its susceptibility to moral hazard 
(e.g., Smith & Goodwin, 1996). 9  Several recent papers have also studied group 
microinsurance (e.g., Janssens & Kramer, 2013; Clarke et al., 2012). This study fills an 
important gap in the literature on insurance and information, however, as the first to 
explore the implications of the group structure and the information environment for 
decision-making in the context of weather insurance.  
 
  
                                                     
8 As this study focuses on contexts with strong network effects and redistribution norms, 
approval rights and perfect monitoring are expected to be closely linked. 
9 Crop insurance provides a payout in the event of crop failure. Such a product incentivises 
moral hazard in contexts with imperfect information about farmer effort: an insurance agent 
visits each plot of land to determine payouts, but is not always present to monitor farmer effort. 
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1.2.2 Conceptual framework 
 
Building on this literature, the following conceptual framework illustrates how changes 
in insurance structure and the information environment lead to differential effects on 
investment decisions. To clarify what this simple world looks like, consider a risky 
environment in which three randomly assigned10 smallholder farmers grow cotton. In 
line with the experimental design described in the next section, this world has the 
following structure:  
 
• At t=0, each farmer starts the period with the same endowment e.  
 
• At t=1, each farmer is mandated11 to purchase an individual weather insurance 
product. The payout t for this policy is triggered with probability 1-p. Assuming 
the policy is actuarially fair, then m = (1-p)t where m is the insurance premium. 
Importantly, this policy offers partial insurance, as payouts are determined at the 
rainfall station and are not perfectly correlated with losses suffered on individual 
plots of land. The three farmers live in close proximity and the probability of 
receiving a payout (1-p) or no payout (p) is identical across the three farms. 
Individual shocks and payouts are strongly correlated, but not perfectly correlated 
(i.e. there is limited basis risk). For tractability, the three farmers have the same 
expectation about basis risk.  
 
• At t=2, each farmer aims to simultaneously optimise his investment decision 
among two fertilisers with cost f: (i) a low-risk fertiliser (l) and (ii) a high-risk 
                                                     
10 That is, they do not self-select into a group. While this assumption limits the generalisability 
of this framework, it offers a relevant case as countries such as India strive towards universal 
coverage through national schemes. This research focus is also an important first step in 
understanding the implications of group insurance, and is a useful prerequisite to future studies 
on the implications of group insurance for specific sub-sets of the target population. 
11 While studying investment choices conditional on insurance is a narrower research question, 
the policy implications of this design are still important because India increasingly mandates 
insurance coverage by building it into agricultural loans. This theoretical focus is also taken to 
align with a feasible experimental design. 
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fertiliser (h). Fertiliser is used for illustrative purposes in this framework, though it 
can be applied to other key agricultural investment choices made by smallholder 
farmers that affect unobservable risks.12  
 
The individual fertiliser choice is a function of the probability of drought on the 
individual plot and the individual’s risk preferences r. The return on these two 
fertilisers depends on rainfall on the individual plot and a random component. 
Relative to fertiliser l, fertiliser h yields higher average returns (y + ai + bi) in 
periods with rainfall (p) and lower average returns (y-ci) in periods with drought 
(1- p), where y is the base income, ai is the income increase from rainfall, bi is the 
return from high-risk fertiliser in rainfall and ci is the loss in income from the high-
risk fertiliser in drought. Subscripts denote heterogeneity across individuals due to 
idiosyncratic risk on individual plots of land.   
 
Prior to choosing a fertiliser, the three farmers can informally discuss the two 
alternatives. Choices are then made simultaneously and privately.  
 
• At t=3, these choices are revealed across the village, as there is perfect information 
about investment decisions.13  
 
• At t=4, weather conditions are determined. As previously mentioned, each farmer’s 
yields are affected by two factors: (i) exogenous rainfall at the individual plot and 
                                                     
12 Different levels of risk can be undertaken through variation in either the (i) type or (ii) 
quantity of fertiliser used. In terms of type effects, risk may be increased by adopting a fertiliser 
that requires more precise rainfall to maximise yields or by experimenting with a new fertiliser 
that has a learning curve for determining optimal allocation. In terms of quantity effects, risk 
may be increased by augmenting fertiliser amounts: in seasons with insufficient rainfall, high 
fertiliser application leads to sunk expenditure costs and lower yields through soil scorching. 
This paper focuses on the former. 
13 As will be discussed in the experimental treatment design, choices are not revealed in the 
context of imperfect information. 
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(ii) an individual investment decision. When a shock occurs, it affects the entire 
group, but to varying degrees.14 
 
• At t=5, each farmer receives income earned (and an insurance payout t if a shock 
occurs).  
 
• At t=6, the three farmers can conduct informal transfers to mitigate idiosyncratic 
risk amongst themselves.  
 
• Lastly, at t=7, the farmers return to t=0: this is a repeated game. 
 
This framework can be used to illustrate how varying the type of insurance (from 
individual to group) and the information environment (from perfect information to 
imperfect information) may change investment decisions. For ease of comparison across 
different types of insurance, Table 1.2 presents payoffs in each state of the world 
(drought in Column 3 and optimal rainfall in Column 4), expected payoffs (Column 5) 
and the difference in payoffs across the two states (Column 6). Choosing the low-risk 
fertiliser l with no insurance corresponds to lottery A, which provides a payout of y in 
case of drought and y + ai in case of rainfall. Choosing the high-risk fertiliser h with no 
insurance corresponds to lottery B. Lotteries A′ and B′ correspond to choosing 
fertilisers l and h in contexts with individual insurance, respectively, etc. 
 
  
                                                     
14 I assume that yields are imperfectly correlated across the three farmers to focus on the case in 
which risk sharing is possible. 
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Table 1.2 Fertiliser choice and expected payoffs15 
 
 
1.2.2.1 Individual insurance 
 
To compare the differential payoffs and risk profiles of the six lotteries, let’s start with 
individual insurance. Table 1.2 illustrates how individual insurance leads to greater risk 
taking than no insurance: expected payoffs are equal with and without insurance 
(Column 5), but individual insurance involves less risk because the difference in payoffs 
is lower (Column 6). I expect this risk reduction will lead some farmers with individual 
insurance to take on riskier ex-post investment decisions - and thus achieve higher 
average yields - than they would with no insurance. 
 
Intuitively, the effect of perfect or imperfect information about investment decisions on 
risk taking is ambiguous. In scenarios with perfect information, peers can observe all 
rainfall levels in the village, investment decisions (h or l) and income realisations. If the 
information parameter is relaxed, peers can observe income realisations, but rainfall 
                                                     
15 No Insurance and Individual Insurance are adapted from Hill and Viceisza (2012). 
(2)       
Risk-level
(3)                           
Payoff in 
drought             
(1-p)
(4)                           
Payoff in  
rainfall        
(p)
(5)                                    
Expected payoff                  
(EP)
(6) = (4) - (3)              
Difference in 
payoff across       
(1-p)  & (p)
A Low-risk y y + a i y + pa i a i
B High-risk y - c i y + a i + b i y + pa i  - c i (1-p) + pb i a i  + b i  + c i
A
I
Low-risk y - m + t y + a i  - m y + pa i a i - t
B
I
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A
II
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y - base income c - income decrease from high-risk fertiliser in drought
a - income increase from rainfall b - income increase from high-risk fertiliser in rainfall
m - insurance premium p - probability of optimal rainfall at rainfall station
t - insurance payout d - distribution of insurance payout (penalty/bonus)
NO INSURANCE
INDIVIDUAL WEATHER INSURANCE
GROUP WEATHER INSURANCE
(1)  
Lottery
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levels at the individual plot and investment decisions are private. In both cases, farmers 
do not have the financial power to withhold or seize the insurance payout t because 
payouts are distributed directly to each farmer. Imperfect information enables some 
moral hazard through informal transfer requests, but it also constrains the effectiveness 
of informal insurance. Thus, the effect of the information environment in the context of 
individual insurance is unclear. 
 
1.2.2.2 Group insurance 
  
As individual insurance faces challenges in practice – such as low take-up - now 
consider the effect of information on investments when the individual insurance policy 
at t=1 is changed to a group insurance policy with a payout of 3t. While group 
insurance may address the aforementioned take-up problems, this rest of this section 
illustrates that - relative to the individual insurance benchmark - group insurance may 
exacerbate two other issues depending on the information environment: (i) high risk 
taking due to an increase in moral hazard in group insurance with imperfect 
information (Group Imperfect) and (ii) low risk taking due to group pressure in group 
insurance with perfect information (Group Perfect).  
 
In contrast to individual insurance, group insurance awards the group physical control 
over the payout and the right to decide what proportion to distribute to each group 
member. A social planner exogenously imposes the following decision rule for this 
distribution process: 16 each individual’s insurance payout is equal to t + di. where di is a 
distribution penalty or bonus determined as a function of two factors: 
 
(i) individual i’s fertiliser choice relative to the group average (di > 0 for 
individuals that take less risky investments and di < 0 for individuals that take more 
risky investments) and  
                                                     
16 As this study will describe, such a decision rule is consistent with farmer behaviour in the 
experiment. 
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(ii) individual i’s income realisation relative to the group average (di > 0 for 
individuals with income below the group average and di < 0 for individuals with income 
above the group average).  
 
As the group payout 3t is fixed, d1 + d2 + d3 = 0. Drawing on the microfinance 
literature (Fischer, 2013), such a decision rule is consistent with the logic that groups 
support losses, but discourage risk taking because they have to share the cost of crop 
failure (by awarding a larger proportion of 3t to group members with greater losses) 
and do not necessarily reap the benefits when a group member has a successful crop. 
 
With this structure in mind, let’s first explore the case of “Group Imperfect”. As a 
benchmark, a farmer with “Individual Imperfect” can hide his choices and ask for 
informal transfers, but peers do not have a formal obligation to fully insure his losses. 
Under “Group Imperfect”, however, one would intuitively expect moral hazard to be 
even higher because the insurance payout is controlled by the group and partitioned 
according to the abovementioned distribution rule. As fertiliser choices are private, the 
farmer now has an added incentive to choose fertiliser h because he can hide this choice 
from the group and then claim a higher di.  
 
Relative to individual insurance, group insurance introduces an additional source of 
moral hazard by increasing the size of the pot that is earmarked for sharing. Contrary 
to the clearly delineated ownership of an insurance payout from an individual policy, 
ownership of a group payout depends on losses suffered. As the farmer’s dominant 
strategy is to lie under imperfect information, the redistribution rule is based on the 
only publicly available information: income realisations. However, such an adjustment 
still leaves room for moral hazard. If the group awards higher payouts to individuals 
with lower income (di > 0 for individuals with income below the group average and di 
< 0 for individuals with income above the group average), a farmer is more likely to 
choose fertiliser h under “Group Imperfect” than under “Individual Imperfect” because 
it generates higher expected payoffs. Such an effect is then magnified if farmers suspect 
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their peers will choose fertiliser h; as the cost of insuring these investments is too high, 
the choices of others may be distorted and they may engage in risky practices as well 
(Fischer, 2013).  
 
Let’s now consider the case of group insurance and perfect information about peer 
investment choices (“Group Perfect”). In line with the decision rule, “Group Perfect” is 
expected to lead to lower risk taking relative to “Individual Perfect”. Under “Group 
Perfect”, the group redistributes 3t as a function of both individual income and fertiliser 
choice (l or h). To reduce the likelihood of doling out larger payout proportions to 
support high losses by risk-takers, groups pressure members to take less risk. This is 
achieved by increasing the penalty (d < 0) in order to reduce the expected payoff of 
Lottery B′′ (as you may recall, Lottery B′′ corresponds to selecting fertiliser h under 
group insurance). If di(1-p) is large and negative for risk-takers, a farmer with “Group 
Perfect” is more likely to choose fertiliser l than under “Individual Perfect” because the 
difference in expected payoffs across fertiliser l and h is reduced. Thus, group pressure is 
expected to outweigh moral hazard in “Group Perfect” (relative to “Individual 
Perfect”).  
 
For these predictions about investment decisions to hold, a second factor – in addition 
to the information environment - should be kept in mind. Importantly, the risk 
preference composition of the group is expected to affect the relationship between 
insurance structure and investment decisions. In particular, one would not expect 
significant levels of group pressure to occur amongst groups with homogeneous risk 
preferences – which is likely to arise if group members self-select (Ghatak, 2000; 
Attanasio, Barr, Cardenas, Genicot & Meghir, 2012). With heterogeneous preferences, 
on the other hand, group members are likely to have different investment choices. As 
this study focuses on the case of groups that are randomly assigned - i.e. they do not 
self-select – heterogeneous preferences are the main case of interest.  
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In contexts with imperfect information, it should also be kept in mind that certain risk 
preferences may also lead to heterogeneous effects. In particular, less risk averse 
individuals may be more likely to free ride (Fischer, 2013; Janssens & Kramer, 2013). 
On the other hand, more risk averse individuals may be more likely to reduce risk 
taking due to greater reliance on informal risk sharing and concern that it is a less 
effective form of insurance under imperfect information. 
 
The literature on group risk aversion also points to several possible implications of risk 
preferences in a group setting. In contexts with perfect information, group pressure may 
lead to a convergence of investment decisions to the average: less risk averse farmers are 
pressured to make less risky choices while more risk averse farmers are pressured to 
take riskier investments that match the group norm.17 Some studies would even suggest 
that groups conform to below average individual risk levels.18  
 
In sum, the dominant effect of moral hazard and group pressure on ex-post investments 
may differ according to the type of insurance, the information environment and risk 
preferences within the group. In this regard, this framework leads to three testable 
predictions: (i) investment decisions will be less risky in “Group Perfect” than in 
“Individual Perfect” due to relatively higher levels of group pressure in “Group 
Perfect”; (ii) investment decisions will be riskier in “Group Imperfect” than “Individual 
Perfect” due to relatively higher opportunities for moral hazard in “Group Imperfect”; 
and, a clear comparative static following from the first two predictions, (iii) investment 
decisions will be less risky in “Group Perfect” than in “Group Imperfect” due to 
stronger group pressure and moral hazard effects, respectively. Importantly, 
heterogeneous risk preferences within groups are likely to exacerbate these predictions.19 
                                                     
17 Alternatively, more risk averse individuals may feel they having nothing to lose from taking on 
higher risk because the less risk averse majority would dictate the distribution rule in their 
favour. 
18 Groups are found to be more risk averse when faced with low probabilities of winning (e.g., 
Baker, Laury & Williams, 2008; Shupp & Williams, 2008; He, Martinsson & Sutter, 2011). 
19 One can envision several secondary effects of group versus individual insurance and perfect 
versus perfect information that fall outside the primary focus of this study. For instance, 
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1.3 Experimental design 
 
To determine how big the effect of different insurance structures are and how these 
effects depend on the information environment, I conducted a framed field experiment 
with smallholder farmers in Gujarat, India. While the external validity of a lab 
experiment is more limited than a field experiment, a lab setting offers valuable first 
insights into the research topic at hand. First and foremost, a lab experiment facilitates 
a cleaner analysis. For instance, narrowing the risk factors to rainfall levels and input 
choice through a lab environment enables a more robust analysis of the interactions 
between these two risks and insurance - in a field experiment, there are multiple other 
drivers of crop failure that cannot be disentangled. As proposed by Levitt and List 
(2007), this cleaner approach should still be externally valid as I simulate real world 
decisions with similar ethical considerations, peer scrutiny and high financial stakes.  
 
A second motivation for employing a lab design is that it is a cost efficient method for 
taking a first look at the implications of group insurance. As group insurance could 
affect farmers’ investment decisions, it is preferable to investigate these predictions in a 
lab setting before launching real products that could have welfare-reducing effects. This 
experiment thus acts as a proof of concept to provide a preliminary exploration of the 
issue at hand.  
 
Finally, a lab experiment is more effective at capturing the effect of insurance on 
investment decisions, as it is difficult to measure variation in investment decisions by 
offering real high-yield seeds or fertiliser in a field experiment. Participants may already 
have trusted distribution channels for purchasing these products, and thus skew the 
results by making random choices in the games because they have no intention of 
purchasing products offered by the experiment.  
                                                                                                                                                         
imperfect information could decrease risk taking across all scenarios because it constrains 
informal risk sharing. On the other hand, group weather insurance could increase risk taking by 
facilitating enhanced risk sharing (though this is unlikely to be the dominant effect given that 
informal risk sharing is common practice among the rural poor). 
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With these rationales in mind, this experiment was conducted with a sample of 329 
smallholder farmers from the Ahmedabad district in Gujarat, India. Gujarat offers an 
ideal case for exploring this topic as one of the main hubs for weather insurance sales in 
India. More broadly, India offers an important country case as its microinsurance 
industries and insurance regulations are among the most advanced in the developing 
world (ILO, 2006), and the Indian government is committed to the spread of 
microinsurance in the coming years (Gine, Menand et al., 2010).  
 
Participants were recruited for this experiment through assistance from Taluka 
Development Officers and Sarpanch (block and village level government representatives, 
respectively). All participants (i) grow cotton, (ii) own between 1 and 10 acres of land, 
(iii) are at least 18 years old and (iv) live within 10 km of a rainfall station. The 
experiment was conducted in a temporary experimental laboratory in Ahmedabad in 
March and April 2013, a time of year in which cotton farmers have fewer fieldwork 
responsibilities. 
 
Upon arrival, participants were organised into groups of three to simulate local 
communities in the experiment.20 To reduce the risk of informal transfers among group 
members after the lab, participants were matched in groups with farmers from other 
blocks.21 While these random group assignments limit (a conservative view of) the 
external validity of these findings to externally-organised - as opposed to self-selected - 
weather insurance groups, this is an important first question and paves the way for 
subsequent research on self-selected groups.  
 
Each farmer was paired with an interviewer, who was responsible for individually 
explaining the games, testing participant comprehension and collecting participant data 
                                                     
20  Twenty-four participants (eight farmers from three villages) were interviewed per day, 
organised into eight sessions with three farmers each. Two sessions were run at a time in 
adjoining rooms. 
21 Blocks are district sub-divisions comprising groups of villages. 
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on a personal laptop. The interview lasted approximately two hours and had four 
components: a Binswanger lottery game to measure risk preferences;22 the experiment 
on investment decisions I examine in this study; a second experiment on informal 
insurance and weather insurance take-up explored in Essay 2, and a series of follow-up 
questions to collect data on the participant’s characteristics and decision-making 
processes in the lab. The order of the two experiments (on investment decisions and 
take-up) were randomised across the sample to control for the risk that playing one 
game first might affect choices in the second. 
 
Participants were paid privately at the end of the session for their earnings in one 
randomly selected round of either this experiment, the take-up experiment or the 
Binswanger lottery to measure risk aversion.23 Total earnings per participant ranged 
from Rs 150 to Rs 570. Average earnings were Rs 267 (approximately $5),24 equivalent 
to approximately three days’ wages from farm labour. 
 
1.3.1 Experiment overview 
 
The central component of this experiment is a series of Kharif season simulation rounds 
that follow the same timing of events laid out in the conceptual framework:25 
  
                                                     
22 In the Binswanger lottery, participants are offered a choice between eight lotteries, each of 
which is determined by drawing a black or white ball from a bag. Each outcome has probability 
0.5. The amounts for each of these lotteries are demonstrated with an image of the 
corresponding rupee notes (Binswanger, 1980; Fischer, 2013; see Appendix II). The actual ball 
draw takes place at the end of the interview, so as not to influence participant choices 
throughout the other games and follow-up questions. 
23 Participants are only paid for one round so that individuals do not partially self-insure across 
rounds (Fischer, 2013). 
24 Participants also received free travel to and from Ahmedabad and lunch on-site. Travel time 
to the laboratory ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 hours. 
25 See Appendix I – Phase 5 for experiment script example. 
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endow-
ment 
Mandate 
insurance 
Choose 
investment 
Announce 
investment 
choice (GP 
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weather 
Reveal 
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insurance 
payout        t 
(IP) or 3t 
(GP + GI) 
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transfers 
End. 
Go to 
t=0 
 
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of insurance structures and information 
access on investment decisions, small variations in this timing are introduced by 
randomly assigning participants to one of the following three treatments: 26 
 
• Individual Perfect (IP) - individual insurance with perfect information about 
peer investments  
• Group Perfect (GP) - group insurance with perfect information about peer 
investments 
• Group Imperfect (GI) - group insurance with imperfect information about peer 
investments 
 
In the treatment with individual insurance, payouts are awarded directly to each 
participant when a drought occurs. In treatments with group insurance, insurance 
payouts are awarded to the group as a whole when a drought occurs and the group 
decides internally what proportion of the payout goes to each member.  
In treatments with perfect information, investment decisions are made public to the 
entire group before the weather conditions are revealed for that round. According to 
anecdotal evidence, perfect information is closer to existing practices of sharing 
information about agriculture-related choices with peers (in many rural societies 
                                                     
26 While it would be interesting to include a fourth treatment group with individual insurance 
and imperfect information, sample size restrictions limited how many treatments could be 
included. 
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including Gujarat). 27 28  In the treatment with imperfect information, investment 
decisions are kept private. It should be noted that individuals have an opportunity to 
informally discuss what they think about the investment options in all treatments 
before purchasing; thus, the only difference between perfect information and imperfect 
information is whether or not final choices are announced to group members. 
 
Taking this treatment design into account, the rest of this section reviews the timing of 
events in more depth:29 
 
t=0 Give endowments 
Each farmer is given one acre of land and a cash endowment of 18,600 Game Rupees 
(Rs).30 In each round, participants start with a zero balance and are then given a new 
endowment of Rs 18,600.31 Immediately after receiving the endowment, each participant 
has to pay Rs 10,000 for agricultural inputs (excluding fertiliser). The remainder of the 
endowment is for purchasing insurance and fertiliser. 
 
t=1 Mandate purchase of an insurance product 
Each farmer is presented with a mandatory insurance policy. The face value of this 
actuarially fair policy is m=Rs 3,600 per person. This policy is sold at a discounted 
random price of between Rs 0 and 3,600.32 Following a similar approach to Hill and 
                                                     
27 This is also consistent with the literature on social learning, for which information sharing is a 
prerequisite (e.g. Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; Cai, de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2013). 
28 However, as it is not definitive which world (perfect or imperfect information) is closest to 
reality, a conservative interpretation of the results in this study is that comparing “Group 
Perfect” and “Group Imperfect” serves to bound the effect. 
29 Prior to commencing the game, the following timing of events is explained in great depth to 
each participant individually. Questions to test comprehension are posed periodically throughout 
the instructions. 
30 For this experiment, 100 game rupees are equal to 1 real rupee. 
31 This design feature was included to control for potential income effects. As results in later 
rounds may still be affected, I run several regressions to test for round effects. 
32 This discount is introduced to be consistent with the take-up experiment (see Chapter 2). 
While not in the conceptual framework, a discounted price should not have any significant 
implications for the interpretation of the results in this study as it is employed across all 
treatments. 
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Viceisza (2012), insurance is mandated to ensure sufficient take-up levels to measure 
the impact of different insurance scenarios.33 
 
In the “Individual Perfect” treatment, this is an individual policy with a payout t = Rs 
10,800 when a drought occurs in the village (with probability 1-p). In the “Group 
Perfect” and “Group Imperfect” treatments, this is a group policy with a payout 3t = 
Rs 32,400 for the entire group. 
 
As this is an index policy, shocks are measured at a central rainfall station and t is set 
independently of individual-level losses, thus introducing a limited level of basis risk. 
Importantly, this experimental design assumes a more limited degree of basis risk than 
has historically characterised many weather insurance products by focusing only on 
scenarios in which the farmer suffers a loss and receives an insufficient payout.34 While 
this component of basis risk includes a slightly different distribution of payoffs from the 
(somewhat contested) conventional understanding of the term,35 I expect this structure 
may map more closely with the distribution of lotteries of new and future weather 
insurance structures that reduce basis risk through the installation of more rainfall 
stations, use of satellite data and development of hybrid products with area yield 
insurance.36 Importantly, as the component of basis risk depicted in this experiment is 
constant across the three treatment groups and insurance is mandated, this design 
choice should not influence the treatment effect. Moreover, whether the experimental 
                                                     
33 As aforementioned, this design feature is included to reduce sample size requirements. It is 
nonetheless in line with national decisions in countries such as India to mandate insurance 
coverage by building it into agricultural loans. 
34 Basis risk can be so severe that a farmer receives a payout in years with good yields (upside 
basis risk), or does not receive a payout in years with low yields (downside basis risk). In this 
experiment, I exclude these two extreme scenarios and focus on limited levels of basis risk in 
which losses are incurred and insufficient payouts are disbursed. The narrow range of basis risk 
assumed in this game should be kept in mind when evaluating the external validity of these 
results. 
35 Basis risk has been modelled and defined in a number of ways (e.g., Clarke, 2011; Karlan et 
al., 2014). 
36 This design feature also aimed to simplify the experiment in order to maximise participant 
comprehension. 
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design incorporates full basis risk or a component of basis risk is a secondary concern; 
for the experimental design, one merely needs an unobservable factor that allows for 
moral hazard.  
 
t=2 Make investment decision 
Each participant is offered three fertiliser products that span a range of risk and return 
levels (Table 1.3). 3738 All products cost Rs 5,000. As in the conceptual framework, on 
average, participants that choose risky investments have higher income in rounds with 
optimal rainfall (p) and lower income in rounds with drought (1-p). Expected income 
for the three fertilisers increases with the level of risk. Payoffs are set such that 
individuals with different levels of risk aversion will have different expected utilities, 
and thus, distinct preferences for one of the three products.39  
 
For each fertiliser, income follows a random beta distribution dependent on two factors: 
(i) the investment decision at t=2 and (ii) a random weather condition at t=4.40 The 
random weather draw (p or (1-p)) affects the entire group, but individual earnings may 
vary within these draws, as rainfall varies from plot to plot and investment decisions 
have different payoffs. As earnings can fall anywhere in the ranges in Table 1.3 for any 
fertiliser, however, it is impossible to know with complete certainty which fertiliser an 
individual has chosen based on their income. 
 
  
                                                     
37 To simplify the experiment, I focus on one important investment choice that smallholder 
farmers commonly face. Fertiliser is a key determinant of agricultural income; proper usage of 
fertiliser is associated with higher average productivity (Duflo et al., 2008).  
38 Offering three products diverges from the two options that were presented in the simplified 
conceptual framework. However, this difference in the experimental design should not have any 
implications for the interpretation of the empirical results. 
39 These risk and return levels are constant across all treatments; as basis risk does not vary 
across the treatments, this experiment does not test the effect of basis risk. 
40 The beta distribution is used because it can have finite support for precise ranges (Rs 500-
7,500 in drought, and Rs 25,000-35,000 in optimal rainfall). Moreover, the shape and mean of 
the beta distribution can be manipulated to align with average earnings for each fertiliser and 
weather condition. 
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Table 1.3 Fertiliser options (in Rs)41 
 
 
 
After learning about these three fertilisers, participant comprehension is tested by 
asking each participant to privately explain the difference between them. Participants 
are then instructed to gather with their group members to discuss the three alternatives 
informally. This discussion takes place in all three treatments, thus reducing the risk 
that social learning or herding drives the treatment effect in “Group Perfect”. Fertiliser 
choices are made simultaneously and privately after this discussion. 
 
t=3 Publicly announce investment decision (in GP and IP only) 
After decisions have been made, participants in “Group Perfect” and “Individual 
Perfect” must publicly announce their choice to the group. 
 
t=4 Randomly introduce shock (probability 1 - p = .33) or no shock 
(probability p = .67) 
When a shock occurs (1-p = .33), it affects the entire group, but to varying degrees. 
 
t=5 Reveal income earned and insurance payout if relevant (t in IP; 3t in 
GP and GI) 
Income earned varies across the group. Broadly in line with average earnings for 
growing cotton on one acre of land in Gujarat, individual income ranges from Rs 500 to 
7,500 (y - ci) when there is a shock, and Rs 25,000 to 35,000 (y + ai + bi) when there is 
                                                     
41 These averages are parameters of a beta distribution 
Average income           
if drought                        
(1-p =1/3)
Average income                      
if optimal rainfall                        
(p =2/3)
Expected 
Income
Low-risk fertiliser 6,000 27,000 20,000
Average-risk fertiliser 3,500 30,000 21,167
High-risk fertiliser 2,000 31,000 21,333
Income range                       
if drought
Income range                  
if optimal rainfall
Rs 500-7,500 Rs 25,000-35,000
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no shock. 42  Participants must announce their true earnings to the group in all 
treatments. As this experiment tests for ex-ante moral hazard, the only hidden 
information is the investment decision. 
 
In the “Individual Perfect” treatment, an insurance payout t=Rs 10,800 is distributed 
directly to each participant when a shock occurs. In the “Group Perfect” and “Group 
Imperfect” treatments, the group receives Rs 32,400 and is given free rein over how to 
disburse the payout within the group.  
 
t=6 Allow informal transfers 
After income and payouts have been distributed, participants can informally 
redistribute amongst themselves if they reach such an agreement with any of their 
group members. Such a transfer can be used by participants with individual insurance 
that try to mitigate idiosyncratic risk informally or by participants with group 
insurance that are not satisfied with the group distribution rule and decide to reallocate 
earnings bilaterally. 
 
t=7 Start the game again at t=0 if a white ball is drawn 
The minimum number of rounds in this game is one and the maximum number of 
rounds is eight. Participants are not aware that the game is limited to eight rounds. At 
the end of each round, the group continues to the next round with a probability of 67%: 
if a white ball is drawn from a bag containing two white balls and one violet ball 
(Fischer, 2013). 
 
The possibility of playing multiple rounds aims to mirror dynamic interactions that 
farmers have with peers in real life. While participants start each round with the same 
endowment, 43  repeated interactions facilitate information sharing about peer 
preferences. In the case of “Group Imperfect”, the only information shared is through 
                                                     
42 If the farmer chooses the low-risk fertiliser, bi =ci = 0 
43 To control for wealth effects. 
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informal discussions about the fertiliser products and the announcement of income 
realisations: information thus increases incrementally with each subsequent round, but 
remains imperfect. 
 
To summarise, there are only two differences in the timing of events across the 
treatment groups: (i) whether or not fertiliser choices are publicly announced at t=3 
and (ii) how insurance payouts are disbursed at t=5 (Table 1.4). In all treatments, 
farmers have an opportunity to discuss the fertiliser options, must publicly announce 
income earned and can informally make transfers after income and insurance payouts 
have been distributed. 
 
Table 1.4 Summary of treatments 
 
 
 
  
Fertiliser 
discussion  
t=2
Public 
announcement of 
fertiliser choice            
t=3
Public 
announcement of 
income realisation           
t=5
Group 
payouts     
t=5
Informal 
risk 
sharing  
t=6
Group Perfect (GP) x x x x x
Group Imperfect (GI) x x x x
Individual Perfect (IP) x x x x
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This treatment design facilitates exploration of three key predictions relating to the 
implications of insurance structure and the information environment for ex-post 
investment decisions.44  
 
Prediction 1:  
On average, each individual is predicted to weakly decrease the amount of risk that 
they take from “Individual Perfect” to “Group Perfect”. 
 
Prediction 2:  
On average, each individual is predicted to weakly increase the amount of risk that they 
take from “Individual Perfect” to “Group Imperfect”.  
 
Prediction 3:  
On average, each individual is predicted to weakly increase the amount of risk that they 
take from “Group Perfect” to “Group Imperfect”.  
 
1.4 Experimental results 
 
This section reviews the empirical strategy undertaken to analyse the implications of 
the group structure and the information environment for ex-post investment decisions. 
First, I discuss the descriptive statistics for my sample. Then, I present my analysis of 
the treatment effect on investment choice. This is followed by a discussion of 
mechanisms through which these effects transpire. Finally, I conduct several robustness 
checks of my analysis. 
 
  
                                                     
44 Assuming heterogeneous risk preferences across farmers. 
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1.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The results presented in this study are based on 667 rounds of the investment game, 
played by 319 farmers.45 Summary statistics overall and disaggregated by treatment 
group for several key farmer and household characteristics are presented in Table 1.5 at 
the individual level. The average age of participants was 41 and the majority of 
participants had completed fewer than 7 years of schooling.  
 
Table 1.6 shows differences in means across treatment groups. The number of 
differences that are statistically significant is consistent with what one would expect 
from a random allocation across treatments. In an F-test of joint significance of all 
covariates, I do not reject the hypothesis that the covariates are jointly uncorrelated 
with treatment assignment (p=0.81). No covariates are significant at the 10% level or 
lower when regressing treatment assignment on all covariates and clustering at the 
group level. This provides confidence in the integrity of the randomisation and suggests 
this sample has balance on unobservables. 
 
For nearly all of the variables, the difference in means is not statistically different from 
zero. The main unbalanced observables relate to small subgroups within the sample (i.e. 
farmers that have completed 11th to 12th grade and the distribution of six female 
participants across the sample). To address any differences, controls for variables with 
statistically significant differences are included in the regression analysis. 
 
  
                                                     
45 Of the 329 individuals surveyed after the pilot stage, 10 were excluded from this analysis (7 
with incomplete control variable data, 1 that would not play the Binswanger lottery, and 2 that 
had a missing group member and thus only played the games in a group of 2). Inclusion of these 
observations does not change the results significantly. 
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Table 1.5 Summary statistics 
 
All    
Farmers
Individual 
Perfect (IP)
Group   
Perfect (GP)
Group 
Imperfect (GI)
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Gender (1= Male) 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.97
(0.12) (0.10) (0.00) (0.18)
Age (years) mean 40.70 41.44 41.43 39.41
(13.11) (12.89) (13.05) (13.36)
                   median 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Education
Illiterate 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.20
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40)
Class 1 to 7 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.42
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Class 8 to10 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26
(0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44)
Class 11 to 12 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.11
(0.28) (0.31) (0.21) (0.32)
Graduate 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01
(0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.09)
Plot size (acres) mean 5.17 5.22 5.06 5.22
(2.60) (2.59) (2.55) (2.69)
                         median 4.57 5.14 4.57 4.85
Landowner 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.94
(0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.24)
Village distance from Ahmedabad (Km) 91.18 89.43 92.58 91.36
(25.77) (24.60) (26.38) (26.29)
Caste
        Scheduled Castes (SC) 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.15
(0.37) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35)
        Scheduled Tribes (ST) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
        Other Backward Classes (OBC) 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.54
(0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50)
        Other 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.24
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.43)
Risk aversion parameter
Est. Coefficient of Partial Risk Aversion 1.21 1.34 1.11 1.20
(1.93) (2.09) (1.75) (1.96)
Experience of weather risk / Rainfall risk exposure
Experienced drought in last 3 years 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Number of observations 319 97 106 116
Note: standard deviations in ( ).
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Table 1.6 Difference in means across treatment groups 
 
  
GP vs. IP GI vs. IP GI vs. GP
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Gender (1= Male) -0.02 0.01 0.03*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age (years) -2.03 -0.01 2.02
(1.81) (1.82) (1.78)
Education
Illiterate -0.03 0.00 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Class 1 to 7 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Class 8 to10 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Class 11 to 12 0.01 -0.06 -0.06*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Graduate -0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Plot size (acres) 0.00 -0.16 -0.15
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35)
Landowner 0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Village distance from Ahmedabad (Km) 1.93 3.15 1.22
(3.51) (3.59) (3.54)
Caste
        Scheduled Castes (SC) 0.00 0.07 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
        Scheduled Tribes (ST) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
        Other Backward Classes (OBC) 0.00 -0.12* 0.12*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
        Other 0.00 0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Risk aversion parameter
Est. Coefficient of Partial Risk Aversion -0.14 -0.23 -0.09
(0.28) (0.27) (0.25)
Experience of weather risk / Rainfall risk exposure
Experienced drought in last 3 years 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Note 1: standard errors of the differences in ( ).
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 3: P-value from F-test of joint significance of all covariates above is 0.51. No 
covariates are significant at the 10% level or higher when regressing treatment on all 
covariates and clustering at the group level. Results available upon request.
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1.4.2 Main analysis 
 
This section presents regression analyses of the implications of the group structure and 
the information environment for the level of risk taking in ex-post investment decisions. 
To do so, the following ordinal logit analysis is first employed:  
 
 =   +  	
 + 
 + 
 + 
 +  +  +                       (1.1) 
 
where Yij equals the fertiliser choice of the farmer (one for low-risk, two for average-risk, 
three for high-risk) for individual i in group j.46 GPj is equal to one for farmers in the 
“Group Perfect” treatment and zero otherwise, GIj is equal to one for farmers in the 
“Group Imperfect” treatment and zero otherwise, Ri is an individual measure of risk 
aversion, GPjRi is the interaction effect between the “Group Perfect” treatment and 
risk aversion, GIjRi is the interaction effect between the “Group Imperfect” treatment 
and risk aversion, Xi represents a vector of individual-level baseline control  
variables and εij is the error term. The base category is Individual Perfect (IP). 
 
The above-mentioned interaction terms with an individual measure of risk preferences 
(the coefficient of partial risk aversion47) are included in some specifications to explore 
whether treatments have varying effects among individuals that are more risk averse or 
less risk averse. As discussed in the conceptual framework, I expect less risk averse 
individuals may be coerced to make less risky48 choices in a group setting, while more 
                                                     
46  Several basic statistics on the dependent variable are presented in Table A1.1. The 
distribution of investment decisions by treatment group confirms that there was variation in the 
dependent variable, fertiliser choice. Nearly 50% of participants preferred the high-risk fertiliser. 
Preferences in the remainder of the sample were more or less split across the low-risk and 
average-risk fertilisers. 
47  Risk aversion parameters are presented in Table A1.2. The sample is relatively well 
distributed across the risk spectrum, though slightly more risk loving than in previous studies. 
Approximately 9% of the farmers in this study selected the riskiest lottery, Gamble H, which is 
high in comparison to the less than 2% that selected this gamble in Binswanger (1980) and low 
levels in similar games by Holt and Laury (2002). Participant comprehension of the Binswanger 
lottery was tested carefully in this study, so it is unlikely that lack of understanding is driving 
this trend. 
48 In this context, risky denotes increasing risk as well as increasing expected return. 
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risk averse individuals may be swayed to conform to the group norm. Moreover, less 
risk averse individuals may be more prone to moral hazard, while more risk averse 
individuals may make less risky decisions due to greater reliance on informal insurance 
(which weakens under imperfect information). 
 
Control variables include education, caste, age, gender, assets, landowner status, 
exposure to a shock in the last three years, playing the investment or take-up game 
first, round number, preference for high returns, influence by group members, receiving 
news from TV, receiving news from the newspaper, a dichotomous variable equal to one 
if all group members are of the same caste and an inefficient risk aversion choice.49 
Errors are clustered at the group level. 
 
B1
 
and B2
 
capture the main treatments effects relative to the base category, “Individual 
Perfect.” In line with the conceptual framework, I expect B1
 
to be negative if group 
pressure leads to lower risk taking in the “Group Perfect” treatment. I expect B2
 
to be 
positive if moral hazard induces more risk taking in the “Group Imperfect” treatment. 
B3 will be positive if group pressure declines as risk aversion increases. B4 will be 
negative if the incentive for moral hazard declines as risk aversion increases. 
                                                     
49 Lotteries D and F in the Binswanger lottery are inefficient as they introduce added risk 
without increasing the expected payoff. 
45 
 
Table 1.7 Impact of group insurance and information access on investment decision: ordinal logit 
Treatment effects relative to base category: Individual Perfect (IP) 
 
46 
 
This section presents the main results from several specifications in the ordinal logit 
analysis. All specifications present treatment effects relative to the base category, 
“Individual Perfect”. The left panel presents regressions using the full dataset. Column 
1 of Table 1.7 first presents the main regression without controls. In line with the 
conceptual framework’s first prediction, the coefficient of “Group Perfect” is negative. 
However, it is not significant. My preferred estimate in Column 2 includes controls to 
gain precision. “Group Perfect” (-0.63) is negative and significant at the 5% level. For 
ease of interpretation, Column 2a presents the same regression in Column 2 as odds 
ratios: the odds ratio for “Group Perfect” (0.53) suggests that the odds of investing in 
high-risk fertiliser versus the combined average and low-risk fertilisers are 1.9 times 
greater for farmers with “Individual Perfect” than farmers with “Group Perfect”, 
holding all other factors constant.50 
 
This reduction in risk taking is in line with the first prediction that group pressure to 
take less risk outweighs moral hazard more under “Group Perfect” than under 
“Individual Perfect”. By introducing financial control over group payouts in contexts 
with perfect information about peer choices, groups appear to significantly pressure 
peers to take less risky investments. While group insurance could also theoretically 
encourage risk taking by mitigating idiosyncratic risk through facilitated risk sharing, 
any such effect appears to be overshadowed by group pressure to curb risk taking. 
Indeed, this is consistent with findings from follow-up questions, which affirm that some 
participants felt group pressure to select a certain fertiliser product. 
 
In practical terms, this significant difference also aligns with calculations based on 
average investment decision data and suggests that the group pressure mechanism leads 
to an 8% reduction in risk taking from “Individual Perfect” to “Group Perfect.”51 Based 
                                                     
50 The same odds ratio of 1.9 times applies to the odds of investing in low-risk fertiliser versus 
the combined categories of average- and high-risk fertiliser. 
51 Of course, the external validity of these results depends on the information environment in 
reality. In contexts with less than perfect information, the coefficients of “Group Perfect and 
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on conservative back-of-the-envelope calculations, this sizeable reduction translates to 
an average Rs 107 decline in earnings per acre in this experimental context. However, 
this estimate should be viewed as a conservative estimate of the income effect, as the 
income range of this experiment was limited by constraints in the experimental design. 
Indeed, in view of Duflo et al.’s (2008) finding that returns to fertiliser – a risky 
investment - range from 36 to 257%, an 8% reduction in risk taking could significantly 
constrain yields. 
 
My second prediction - that risk taking will be higher in “Group Imperfect” due to 
heightened moral hazard relative to the base category “Individual Perfect” – has limited 
support in the data. The coefficient for “Group Imperfect” in my preferred specification 
(Column 2) is negative and insignificant. One possible explanation for this result is that 
participants may believe informal insurance is less effective in contexts with imperfect 
information and they thus need to reduce overall risk exposure through less risky 
investments. Alternatively, participants in “Group Imperfect” may be concerned that 
choices are not completely private: while never conclusive, groups may pressure group 
members to make less risky choices by speculating which fertilisers peers choose based 
on their income levels.52  
  
Column 3 provides a first look at heterogeneity within these results according to risk 
preferences. With the inclusion of interaction terms, the coefficient of “Group Perfect” 
is still significant, but the magnitude of the coefficient has decreased slightly. The 
interaction term between “Group Perfect” and risk aversion is not significant. The 
interaction between “Group Imperfect” and risk aversion, on the other hand, is negative 
and significant at the 1% level, indicating some variation according to risk preferences. 
                                                                                                                                                         
“Group Imperfect” bound the effect of the group insurance structure and suggest that moral 
hazard is a secondary effect to group pressure.  
52 A final possible explanation is that high risk taking in “Individual Perfect” is driven by 
competitiveness to ‘look good’ when fertiliser choices must be announced. Due to sample size 
restrictions, it was not possible to include a fourth treatment with individual insurance and 
imperfect information to test this. However, as there is less risk taking in “Group Perfect”, this 
would suggest that risk taking does not have a positive image. 
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Marginal effects presented later in this section provide further evidence on mechanisms 
and heterogeneity across risk aversion levels.  
 
Finally, to explore Prediction 3 – that risk taking is lower in “Group Perfect than in 
“Group Imperfect” - the bottom of Table 1.7 conducts a t-test to compare differences 
across the two treatments for each specification.53 Consistent with my earlier findings, 
this comparative static shows that risk taking is statistically significantly lower in 
“Group Perfect” under certain risk preferences (Col. 3). In particular, “Group 
Imperfect” is associated with higher risk taking than “Group Perfect” among risk-loving 
individuals. However, as risk aversion increases, this difference declines.  
 
The main specifications also indicate that investment decisions are affected by several 
statistically significant control variables. A preference for high returns and higher 
wealth are associated with higher risk taking. Playing this game first in the interview 
and influence from group members are associated with less risk taking. The directions of 
these relationships are in line with expectations and therefore contribute to confidence 
in how lab participants played the investment game. 
 
The right panel in Table 1.7 now runs the same regressions, but excludes observations 
from individuals that selected Gamble D and Gamble F in the Binswanger lottery. As 
these gambles are inefficient, participants that select these choices are sometimes 
dropped with an expectation that such players may also not take games seriously (e.g., 
Stein & Tobacman, 2011).54 Excluding these observations marginally increases the size 
of the coefficients of interest and increases the level of significance. For instance, the 
main coefficient of interest “Group Perfect” in Column 2 is now -0.85 and significant at 
the 1% level. 
In Table 1.8, average marginal effects by level of risk aversion provide a more detailed 
look at the heterogeneity in these results. The first section of the table compares 
                                                     
53 Controlling for interaction terms in the relevant specifications. 
54 As previously mentioned, extensive comprehension testing was utilised to ensure participants 
understood the games.  
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average marginal effects across “Group Perfect” and “Individual Perfect,” providing 
further support for the group pressure story. Average marginal effects suggest that most 
farmers are 11 to 17 percentage points less likely to adopt the high-risk fertiliser in 
“Group Perfect” than in “Individual Perfect”. As these differences are significant across 
most risk aversion levels, this is consistent with the literature suggesting that groups 
reduce risk taking below average individual risk levels (e.g., Baker et al., 2008; Shupp & 
Williams, 2008; He et al., 2011). Even risk averse individuals reduce risk taking in 
“Group Perfect”, suggesting everyone may fear punishment through reduced insurance 
payouts. 
 
Comparing average marginal effects across “Group Imperfect” and “Individual Perfect” 
does not reveal a statistically significant difference at most risk aversion levels. The one 
exception is that farmers with severe to extreme levels of risk aversion are more likely 
to choose low risk fertiliser in “Group Imperfect” than in “Individual Perfect”. This 
difference supports the idea that more risk averse individuals are concerned informal 
insurance is less effective with imperfect information, and thus decide to reduce risk 
exposure through less risky investment decisions. Given the small sample size in these 
categories, however, this finding should be taken with caution. Overall, the statistically 
insignificant differences across “Group Imperfect” and “Individual Perfect” suggests 
that heightened opportunities for moral hazard in “Group Imperfect” are overcome by 
the reduction in risk taking due to reduced informal risk sharing under imperfect 
information. 
 
The final section of Table 1.8 compares “Group Perfect” and “Group Imperfect”. 
Among farmers with slight to negative risk aversion levels, the probability of adopting 
the low-risk fertiliser is approximately 11 percentage points higher with perfect 
information. These farmers are also 14 to 15 percentage points less likely to adopt the 
high-risk fertiliser with perfect information. These average marginal effects are 
consistent with the overarching theories that group pressure is more dominant and 
reduces risk taking in the “Group Perfect” treatment. 
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As risk aversion levels increase, however, these trends weaken and ultimately reverse. 
While the sample of farmers with extreme or severe risk aversion is too small to carry 
much weight, the average marginal effects tentatively suggest that more risk averse 
farmers are less likely to adopt the low-risk fertiliser in “Group Perfect” than in “Group 
Imperfect”. As previously mentioned, this suggests that more risk averse individuals are 
concerned about the quality of informal insurance in contexts with imperfect 
information.55 
 
                                                     
55 Unfortunately, my sample is too small to delve further into the precise combinations of risk 
preferences that may exacerbate treatment effects. 
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Table 1.8 Average marginal effects by level of risk aversion 
 
Fertiliser 
choice Extreme Severe Intermediate Inefficient Moderate Inefficient
Slight to 
neutral
Neutral to 
Negative
0.1340 0.1200** 0.0966** 0.0935** 0.0903* 0.0885* 0.0866* 0.0851*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.0748* 0.0539** 0.0320** 0.0298** 0.0275** 0.0263* 0.0251* 0.0241*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.2088 -0.1739** -0.1286** -0.1233** -0.1179** -0.1148* -0.1116* -0.1092*
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
0.3477*** 0.1860*** 0.0302 0.0140 -0.0021 -0.0112 -0.0203 -0.0274
(0.09) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.1029*** 0.0685*** 0.0125 0.0058 -0.0009 -0.0047 -0.0085 -0.0115
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
-0.4506*** -0.2545*** -0.0427 -0.0199 0.0029 0.0159 0.0289 0.0389
(0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
0.2443** 0.0840 -0.0624 -0.0770* -0.0915* -0.0997** -0.1078** -0.1140**
(0.12) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.0390 0.0201 -0.0187 -0.0235* -0.0284* -0.0312** -0.0340** -0.0362**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
-0.2833** -0.1041 0.0811 0.1006* 0.1199* 0.1308** 0.1417** 0.1502**
(0.14) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
36 47 78 73 188 77 108 60
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Risk aversion level
Note 1: Standard errors in ( ).
Low-           
risk
Sample size
Average-
risk
High-       
risk
IP - GI:
Low-           
risk
Average-
risk
High-       
risk
GP -GI:
Low-           
risk
Average-
risk
High-       
risk
 IP - GP:
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1.4.3 Suggestive evidence on mechanisms  
 
This section contributes additional evidence on the mechanisms through which the 
insurance structure affects investment decisions by exploring differences in the 
dispersion of investment decisions within groups. Intuitively, if group pressure is a 
dominant force in “Group Perfect,” this would lead to a convergence in investment 
decisions as members choose less risky investments. Alternatively, the group structure 
could increase dispersion by facilitating coordination among members to mitigate risk 
through diversified investment choices and shared earnings (Gine, Jakiela, Karlan & 
Morduch, 2010). To disentangle which of these conflicting forces prevails, it is worth 
empirically exploring the effect of the group structure on the dispersion of investment 
decisions. 
 
At the group level, several trends in the data provide suggestive support for the group 
pressure story. While choices converge slightly from Round 1 to Round 2 across all 
treatments, on average, all group members select the same investment most frequently 
in “Group Perfect” (Table A1.3). Correspondingly, the average standard deviation of 
investment decisions within the group is lowest in “Group Perfect” (Table A1.4).56  
 
In contrast to the dispersion story in which farmers diversify investments and share 
earnings informally, the data reveals only low levels of risk sharing. Excluding negative 
transfers, the average level of risk sharing through formal and informal transfers hovers 
around 7% across the sample.5758 The average standard deviation of final earnings is 
                                                     
56 This dispersion may provide a lower bound on the difference across treatments because 
“Group Perfect” also has the highest average standard deviation of risk preferences within the 
group (which would normally contribute to higher dispersion in investment decisions).  
57 In 442 of 667 observations (66%), no risk sharing took place at all. Among the remaining third 
that did engage in risk sharing, many made reciprocal transfers that were returned in subsequent 
rounds. Some also made large transfers to group members for expenses such as purchasing a 
tractor, which technically fell outside the scope of the experiment but were not prohibited. Such 
transfers actually increased disparities in income across the group and can partly explain the low 
level of risk sharing overall. 
58 While this result is lower than in some other studies (e.g., compared to 14% in Fischer, 2013), 
it is not surprising given that players did not know each other and that the structure of the 
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highest in “Group Perfect”, though the average transfer given (including formal 
transfers through group insurance distribution and informal transfers) was also highest 
in “Group Perfect” (approximately Rs 1,500 in “Group Perfect” versus approximately 
Rs 900 in “Group Imperfect” and “Individual Perfect”) (Table A1.5). Transfers are 
noticeably lower in “Group Imperfect”, providing further support for the idea that 
imperfect information reduces risk taking by inhibiting informal risk sharing. 
 
To assess whether these group-level differences are statistically significant in support for 
the group pressure story, an OLS regression is employed to measure the effect of the 
insurance structure and information access on variance in investment decisions within 
groups: 
 
 =   + 	
 + 
 + 
 + 
 +  +  +                          (1.2) 
 
where Vj equals the level of variance in investment decision for group j. GPj is equal to 
one for farmers in the “Group Perfect” treatment and zero otherwise, GIj is equal to one 
for farmers in the “Group Imperfect” treatment and zero otherwise, Si is standard 
deviation of risk aversion at the group level, GPjSi is the interaction effect between the 
“Group Perfect” treatment and standard deviation of risk aversion, GIjSi is the 
interaction effect between the “Group Imperfect” treatment and standard deviation of 
risk aversion, Xj represents a vector of individual-level baseline control 
variables 
averaged at the group level and εj is the error term. The base category is 
Individual Perfect (IP).  
The set of interaction terms with standard deviation of risk aversion are included as 
groups with more homogenous risk preferences are expected to have more homogenous 
investment choices and thus less motivation for group pressure in “Group Perfect.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
game interrupted informal arrangements to make reciprocal transfers (because the game ended 
with a 33% probability in each round). 
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Table 1.9 reveals differential treatment effects on variance in investment decisions 
within the group. The coefficient for “Group Perfect” is negative across all 
specifications. This is consistent with the prediction that group pressure reduces the 
dispersion of investment decisions. In spite of a limited sample size for analyses at the 
group level, these results are significant with the inclusion of controls in Columns 2 and 
3. The significance level and size of the coefficient increase with the inclusion of 
interaction terms in Column 3, but the interaction terms are not significant. 
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Table 1.9 OLS regressions: variance in investment decisions 
Treatment effects relative to base category: Individual Perfect (IP) 
 
 
1.4.4 Robustness checks 
 
This section reviews several robustness checks for the empirical analysis. A first 
potential concern is that events in earlier rounds (such as weather or earnings levels) 
affect participant behaviour in later rounds. In the first panel of Table 1.10, I explore 
this possibility by running the ordinal logit regressions from Table 1.7 and restricting 
the sample to the cleanest data: observations from the first round. 59 While these 
                                                     
59 The first round is also the round in which information about group members is completely 
private; in subsequent rounds, past earnings provide limited information about group members’ 
risk preferences. 
Dependent variable: Variance in investment choice within the group
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS
Group Perfect (GP) -0.21 -0.22* -0.29**
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Group Imperfect (GI) 0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13)
GP*Standard Deviation Risk Aversion 0.05
(0.07)
GI*Standard Deviation Risk Aversion -0.03
 (0.07)
Standard Deviation Risk Aversion -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.06)
Constant 0.63*** 3.43*** 3.48***
(0.11) (1.08) (1.09)
Observations 228 228 228
Controls NO YES YES 
R-squared 0.036 0.192 0.197
P-value of test GP = GI
4
0.011 0.024 0.015
Note 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 4: Interaction terms are included in the relevant specifications.
Note 1: Other controls are education, caste, age, gender, assets, landowner status, 
exposure to a shock in the last three years, round number, preference for high 
returns, receiving news from tv, receiving news from the newspaper and same 
caste (omitted from the table).
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
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regressions are limited by the small sample size, the coefficient of “Group Perfect” is 
negative as in earlier specifications. Interestingly, the coefficient of “Group Imperfect” 
(0.69) is now significant at the 10% level in Column 3, suggesting that there may have 
been some moral hazard in the first round. 
 
A second possible concern is that participants did not give quality responses in the first 
round because they did not fully understand how the game works. While this scenario is 
unlikely because participants received in-depth instructions and comprehension was 
tested prior to commencing the game, I explore this concern in the second panel of 
Table 1.10 by excluding the first round of data. These are the same regressions as with 
Round 1, plus one additional control: the average occurrence of drought is included as a 
proxy for subjective beliefs about drought risk in the current season. As past weather 
experiences have been shown to affect participants’ perception of future weather 
conditions (e.g., Hill & Viceisza, 2012), it is important to consider whether such beliefs 
affect my results. For instance, participants that believe in the law of small numbers 
will expect that early draws decrease the likelihood of similar draws in the long run 
(Rapoport & Budescu, 1997; Rabin, 2002); i.e. that early draws of optimal rainfall 
increase the probability of suffering from a drought in subsequent rounds. Alternatively, 
good weather in many rounds may lead participants to become optimistic about their 
luck with future weather draws. 
 
The regressions excluding Round 1 are in line with predictions and results from the full 
sample. “Group Perfect” is negative and significant at the 10% level in my preferred 
specification (Column 5). This effect appears to have strengthened from the first round, 
suggesting there may have been some learning over time. However, the coefficient  of  
“Group Imperfect”  is  now  negative. Though  insignificant, this  is  in 
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Table 1.10 Ordinal logit by round 
Treatment effects relative to base category: Individual Perfect (IP) 
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contrast to my original predictions and the positive coefficient in the first round data. 
One possible explanation for this is that it took one round for participants in “Group 
Imperfect” to realise that informal insurance was less effective with imperfect 
information or that groups would still speculate about investment decisions based on 
income levels.   
 
Finally, to complement my ordered logit analysis, I also present logit and linear 
probability regressions in Table A1.6. As approximately half of the sample selected the 
riskiest fertiliser, I run logit regressions by combining the low-risk and average-risk 
fertiliser into one category. In general, the logit and linear results are in line with my 
ordinal logit results: “Group Perfect” is associated with lower levels of risk taking than 
“Individual Perfect”. The coefficient for “Group Perfect” is significant at the 10% level 
in Columns 1 and 3. Consistent with earlier findings, the coefficient for “Group 
Imperfect” is insignificant and hovers around zero.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
This study offers several important findings about group insurance with relevant lessons 
for both scholars and practitioners. The first finding is that, in the context of perfect 
information about investment decisions, farmers covered by group insurance pursue less 
risky investments than when covered by individual insurance. By introducing financial 
control over group payouts in contexts with perfect information, groups pressure peers 
to reduce risk taking by 8% on average. Even some risk averse individuals reduce risk 
taking under group insurance and perfect information, suggesting that everyone may 
fear punishment through reduced insurance payouts. Based on Duflo et al.’s (2008) 
finding of high returns to fertiliser, group pressure in the context of group insurance 
could significantly constrain yields. 
 
As suggested by similar risk taking among farmers with group insurance and imperfect 
information versus farmers with individual insurance and perfect information, a second 
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finding is that moral hazard is not a significant concern in the group context. 
Interestingly, this study reveals small variations in this effect: more risk averse 
individuals take even less risk under group insurance and imperfect information than 
under individual insurance and perfect information. Moral hazard incentives appear to 
be overpowered either by the reduction in informal insurance under imperfect 
information or concern that information is not completely hidden.  
 
Collectively, these findings – that interactions between insurance structure, the 
information environment and risk preferences matter for investment decisions – 
contribute to the academic literature on group pressure and provide further support for 
the work of Fischer (2013) and Banerjee et al. (1994) through extensions to the 
microinsurance context. This research also acts as a subtle but important qualifier to 
recent research that has promoted the group structure of insurance as a means to 
increasing take-up (e.g., de Janvry et al., 2014; Cole et al., 2013; Dercon et al., 2014; 
Clarke et al., 2012). While the benefits for take-up are not disputed, reductions in risk 
taking in the group context and thus potential constraints on agricultural productivity 
are brought to light, suggesting the group structure is not the panacea some claim. 
 
In addition to the academic contribution of this work to our understanding of group 
behaviour, this research is particularly pertinent to development practitioners and 
policymakers as proposals to launch group weather insurance products gather 
momentum. Several developing countries are currently launching large-scale 
microinsurance schemes – including weather insurance – which puts a premium on 
designing weather insurance products that maximise welfare benefits for the rural poor. 
The main findings of this study caution against the uniform application of group 
insurance without further research. While allowing groups to distribute payouts may 
increase take-up, whether or not the group structure enhances agricultural productivity 
will depend on its interaction with contextual variables. This study has begun to shed 
light on the interaction with two such variables: the information environment and risk 
preferences. To ensure group insurance structures are designed to maximise overall 
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benefits – rather than only take-up – further research is needed on methods to reduce 
the problem of group pressure arising from such contextual variables.  
 
One potential avenue for mitigating group pressure may be variation in group formation 
mechanisms. This study has focused on the case of externally-organised weather 
insurance groups with diverse risk preferences. As Ghatak (2000) asserts that 
individuals are more likely to risk share among peers with similar risk attitudes, one 
possible solution to group pressure may be to allow self-selection of groups. Indeed, 
several studies have highlighted the efficiency gains of self-selection in risk sharing 
arrangements – and thus provide complementary empirical support for this 
recommendation (Chandrasekhar, Kinnan & Larreguy, 2013; Breza et al., 2013; Gine, 
Jakiela et al., 2010). While groups may also self-select according to other criteria, 
extending this work to the study of self-selected groups and varying the combination of 
risk preferences within groups would be an interesting area for further research. 
 
In sum, this study qualifies prior enthusiasm about group insurance structures. Whether 
or not group structures benefit the insured will depend on interactions with contextual 
factors, including the information environment and risk preference composition. This 
puts a premium on future group insurance designs that take into account the potential 
broader implications of group insurance structures – and future research that sheds 
light on such design options.  
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Essay 2: Informal insurance and moral hazard: determinants of weather 
insurance take-up 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Essay 1, weather insurance was developed to help smallholder farmers 
smooth consumption in the face of aggregate-level rainfall shocks (Gine et al, 2008). 
However, despite numerous marketing and product improvements in recent years, take-
up has been limited (e.g., Cole et al., 2013; Gine, Menand et al., 2010).60 This is 
puzzling given the high subsidies that have accompanied these products. It is also not 
consistent with the prediction of economic theory that purchasing actuarially fair 
insurance is the utility-maximising choice for rational, risk-averse individuals. As 
smallholder farmers appear to be, at least for high payoff levels, risk averse on average 
(Binswanger, 1980), this prediction should hold for weather insurance take-up.61 To 
resolve this puzzle, recent studies have examined the effect of a range of constraints 
including low wealth levels of farmers, lack of liquidity, low levels of financial literacy, 
lack of trust in insurance companies and basis risk (Gine & Yang, 2009; Cole et al., 
2010; Gine et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013). Yet, in these studies, a large fraction of low 
take-up remains unexplained. 
 
This essay contributes to our understanding of barriers to insurance coverage with 
empirical evidence of an additional determinant: informal transfers. Informal transfers 
are key tools for mitigating financial shocks among the rural poor (Townsend, 1994; 
Udry, 1994). In view of the overlapping objectives of informal transfers and formal 
insurance, it follows intuitively that their usage may be intertwined. While some studies 
have shown formal and informal insurance to be complements in contexts with basis 
                                                     
60 As low as 5% to 25%, even with significant subsidies (e.g. Gine et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013). 
61  As a caveat to this, it should be noted that Clarke (2011) proposes – under certain 
assumptions - that the relationship between insurance and risk preferences is ambiguous in 
contexts with basis risk. In line with proposals for future weather insurance and hybrid products, 
this study focuses on the case of insurance with limited basis risk, which has also suffered from 
low take-up.  
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risk (e.g., Dercon et al., 2014; Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2013), an important unknown is 
how they interact in contexts with more limited (or without) basis risk. As basis risk is 
increasingly reduced by pairing weather insurance with other products and technologies 
such as area yield insurance and satellite data, this case is increasingly important.  
 
In addition to empirically testing the effect of informal transfers on take-up, the aim of 
this study is to unpack two alternative channels through which this effect may transpire. 
Moral hazard – the first channel – arises via transfers organised after a shock occurs. 
Due to strong redistribution norms, transfers to reallocate income are frequent and 
central to financial security in developing countries (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). In an 
environment with a moral obligation to support peers in times of need, some individuals 
may reduce their willingness to pay for insurance if they know that they can ask their 
insured peers for transfers in the event of a shock. Such behaviour can then have ripple 
effects: individuals who normally purchase insurance may also reduce their willingness 
to pay because they feel a cultural obligation to share insurance payouts informally 
with their network when these payouts are public knowledge. Lower investment due to 
moral hazard has been identified in other domains (e.g., Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Di 
Falco & Bulte, 2011; 2012), further motivating a closer look at the applications of this 
trend for weather insurance take-up. The implications of this phenomenon for weather 
insurance have been explored in the theoretical literature (de Janvry et al., 2014), but 
have yet to be tested empirically. 
 
Informal risk sharing – the second channel – refers to an explicit agreement to share a 
policy amongst peers by purchasing together and exchanging informal transfers. Access 
to informal transfers may affect take-up through such a channel if farmers are not 
expected utility maximisers. Moreover, such an arrangement may arise among farmers 
that are not familiar with insurance or that do not fully trust the insurance provider. 
Importantly, arrangements to informally share risk by buying a policy together are not 
motivated by moral hazard because they are explicitly organised before income 
realisations are known. In the case of weather insurance, such arrangements can 
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increase or decrease take-up depending on how likely farmers are to purchase full 
policies independently. 
 
Bringing together insights from the literatures on informal risk sharing and 
redistribution norms, I disentangle these two channels through which informal transfers 
can affect formal insurance via a framed field experiment with 290 smallholder farmers 
in Gujarat, India. This experiment is structured as a series of Kharif season simulations 
in which willingness to pay (WTP) is elicited for a simple weather insurance product. 
An empirical test of the relative importance of moral hazard and informal risk sharing 
lends itself well to disentanglement in a laboratory setting such as this in which 
informal transfers can be limited.  
 
An additional virtue of this experimental design is that I abstract away from the issue 
of risk sharing to mitigate basis risk62 by eliciting WTP for a weather insurance product 
with a limited degree of basis risk and can then focus on alternative channels through 
which transfers affect weather insurance take-up. The experiment is designed such that 
farmers want to purchase insurance assuming expected utility preferences. If farmers are 
expected utility maximisers, then a decrease in WTP could only be explained by moral 
hazard. However, if farmers are not expected utility maximisers, they may want to 
share a policy.  
 
Two treatment arms are randomly assigned across the sample to unpack the effect of 
transfers on insurance take-up: (i) insurance without the right to give and receive 
transfers (No Transfer) and (ii) insurance with the right to give and receive transfers 
(Transfer). The difference across these two treatment effects captures the overall effect 
of access to informal transfers. Cross-referenced follow-up questions are then used to 
disentangle the mechanisms through which this effect occurs. 
 
                                                     
62 This has been explored by Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012). 
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The core result from this experiment is that moral hazard reduces weather insurance 
take-up. On the whole, I find movement on the extensive margin. Allowing informal 
transfers leads to a 14% jump in the number of people unwilling to pay any price for 
insurance. Assuming expected utility preferences, this is consistent with a model of 
moral hazard but not consistent with a model of informal risk sharing to try out a 
policy. When farmers are allowed to give and receive transfers after a shock has 
occurred, many decide not to purchase insurance. The experiment also reveals a more 
pronounced decline in WTP among poorer individuals. Lastly, there is some evidence 
that informal risk sharing to try out a policy affects take-up, but it is limited. The 
scholarly implication is clear: while networks offer consumption smoothing benefits, 
they also reduce weather index insurance coverage due to moral hazard.  
 
Beyond its scholarly relevance, these findings have important policy repercussions. 
Informal transfers are likely to increase with the growing momentum of group weather 
insurance policies: group structures facilitate information sharing and strengthen 
networks through repeated interactions. Against this backdrop, increasing weather 
insurance take-up requires amendments in the product design and targeting to account 
for the downward pressure of moral hazard – for instance, through sales in geographical 
areas with weaker redistribution norms or through all or none sales of group weather 
insurance. 
 
To derive these generalisations, this essay is organised as follows. First, I discuss the 
related literature and theory about the interactions between informal transfers and 
formal insurance. Then, I review the experimental protocols and implementation 
strategy. Next, I present the empirical strategy and discuss the results. Finally, I 
conclude with a discussion of potential academic and policy implications. 
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2.2 Related literature and theoretical motivation 
 
A range of scholarly works has examined the interaction between informal transfers and 
insurance (e.g., Dercon et al., 2014; Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2012). Yet, the literature 
fails to distinguish between the implications of transfers motivated by (i) moral hazard 
and (ii) risk sharing to try out a policy. To theoretically disentangle these effects on 
formal insurance, I bring together insights from two, hitherto largely separate, 
literatures on: (i) redistribution norms and decision-making and (ii) formal and informal 
insurance interactions. Drawing on these literatures and deductive reasoning, I explore 
the effects of the moral hazard channel and the informal risk sharing channel on take-
up in the following basic conceptual framework.  
 
In line with the experimental design described in the next section, consider a simplified 
world in which three farmers in a village face the risk of crop yield loss due to drought 
or flood.  
 
• At t=0, each farmer has an endowment of one acre of land on which he grows 
cotton. As cotton yields are highly sensitive to rainfall levels, income y fluctuates 
according to local rainfall conditions.  
 
• At t=1, each farmer learns about a weather index insurance policy and discusses the 
policy with the other farmers in the village. This policy is actuarially fair, i.e. m = 
(1-p)t where m is the insurance premium, 1-p is the probability of a shock occurring 
in the village and t is the insurance payout.  
 
The farmers are risk averse and follow a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. 
The natural prediction of this model is that the farmers will decide to purchase the 
insurance policy because expected utility is higher with insurance than without 
insurance. 
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• At t=2, each farmer decides whether or not to purchase the insurance policy. This 
decision is public and simultaneous across the village.  
 
• At t=3, a random weather condition is revealed at the village level. A shock occurs 
with probability 1-p and optimal rainfall occurs with probability p. 
 
• At t=4, income earned and insurance payouts (when relevant) are revealed. Income 
varies across the group, ranging from ysl to ysh when there is a shock and ynl to ynh 
when there is no shock. However, insurance payouts (t) are constant across all 
farmers, reflecting a limited level of basis risk.63 While index insurance policies are 
historically subject to high basis risk, this framework focuses on formal-informal 
interactions in the context of limited basis risk – a case of particular importance in 
view of rising efforts to reduce basis risk through hybrid products and the use of 
satellite data.64 
 
• At t=5, the three farmers have an opportunity to engage in informal transfers.  
 
• Lastly, at t=6, the farmers return to t=0: this is a repeated game. 
The aim of this study is to unpack two channels through which the right to exchange 
transfers at t=5 may affect insurance take-up at t=2. The first channel is moral hazard. 
Assuming expected utility preferences, farmers demand full insurance coverage. 
                                                     
63 As discussed in Essay 1, basis risk refers to the imperfect correlation between insurance 
payouts (which are determined by aggregated data from local rainfall stations) and shocks 
experienced at the household level (Clarke, 2011). While not central to this framework, the three 
farmers have the same expectation about the limited degree of basis risk in this context. 
64 While outside the scope of this study, it is important to note that the formal-informal 
insurance relationship is altered in contexts with high basis risk. According to Dercon et al. 
(2014), demand for index insurance is expected to be higher among peers that can share risk 
informally: the complementarity of formal weather insurance and informal risk sharing is 
strengthened if farmers can mitigate basis risk by purchasing insurance and agreeing ex-ante to 
equalise income by reallocating payouts through informal transfers according to individual losses. 
Consistent with this intuition, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) find that informal risk sharing is 
a complement to formal weather insurance in contexts with high basis risk. 
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However, introducing access to informal transfers may reduce take-up of formal 
insurance by encouraging moral hazard (Arnott & Stiglitz, 1991). Farmers have an 
incentive to support their peers when suffering from a shock if they wish to have 
support themselves in future years (Sahlins, 1972; Dzingirai, 2004). In other words, gift-
giving is a “culturally constructed livelihood strategy” (Hospes & Lont, 2004, p. 15). If 
redistribution norms implicate a moral obligation for the financially solvent to support 
free riders (Scott, 1976), moral hazard may decrease take-up as farmers know they can 
ask for a transfer and thus are less dependent on formal insurance. 
  
Such a phenomenon is in line with empirical studies linking redistributive norms to 
moral hazard – and moral hazard to changes in risk mitigation. Di Falco and Bulte 
(2012), for instance, find that redistribution norms foster a free riding culture and lower 
adoption of soil conservation measures. Jannsens and Kramer (2014) also find evidence 
of free riding among less risk averse individuals in the context of health insurance in 
Tanzania. In a related literature, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) find that many farmers 
strategically wait to adopt new crops with the intention of benefiting from peer 
knowledge once a number of other farmers in the network have tested the crop.  
 
In turn, the literature suggests that these instances of moral hazard generate ripple 
effects due to a fear of free riding. For instance, Di Falco and Bulte (2011) propose that 
redistribution norms may stunt income growth as individuals increase non-sharable 
durable accumulation to avoid supporting free riders. Grimm, Hartwig and Lay (2013) 
find that redistributive pressures from family and kin reduce incentives to invest in 
enterprise capital in Burkina Faso. Finally, Baland, Guirkinger & Mali (2011) find 
evidence of inefficient borrowing and saving in Cameroon in an effort to avoid pressure 
to redistribute by ‘appearing poor’.  
 
Similar to these trends in other domains, moral hazard may reduce take-up of weather 
insurance. In particular, I expect some farmers to reduce their willingness to pay for 
insurance if they can ask their insured peers for transfers in the event of a shock. As a 
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result, farmers who would otherwise purchase insurance may also reduce their 
willingness to pay because of a cultural obligation to share insurance payouts informally 
with their network when these payouts are public knowledge. This downward pressure 
arises as the insured recognise that they cover the full financial costs of weather 
insurance while reaping only part of its benefits. A similar argument is developed 
theoretically by de Janvry et al. (2014). They propose that formal insurance against 
common shocks is crowded out by informal risk sharing because a farmer will not 
purchase insurance if he anticipates that his peers will avoid insurance and attempt to 
free ride. In their model, the decision to purchase insurance by one farmer provides a 
positive externality for his peers. As households may only purchase full coverage for one 
household, sharing payouts with others limits coverage of the insured household. 
 
The second channel through which informal transfers may affect weather insurance 
take-up is informal risk sharing. This could arise if we relax the assumption that 
farmers are expected utility maximisers. In doing so, farmers may decide to share a 
weather insurance policy by exchanging informal transfers to cover the premium and 
share the payout because they don’t want full insurance. Moreover, the uncertainty 
surrounding this new financial product means that some farmers may want to test it 
out without making a full financial investment. Farmers may prefer informal risk 
sharing arrangements with peers that they trust over large insurance companies. By 
making an ex-ante arrangement for one farmer to purchase insurance and other(s) to 
contribute to the premium through informal transfers, farmers can purchase partial 
coverage under what would otherwise be an indivisible product. Depending on how 
likely these individuals are to purchase a full policy independently, this mechanism will 
lead to an increase or decrease in take-up. 
 
Importantly, the relevance of the moral hazard and informal risk sharing channels may 
also vary according to heterogeneous personal characteristics. In particular, risk 
preferences may lead to differential levels of moral hazard. Drawing on Fischer (2013) 
and Janssens and Kramer (2014), less risk averse individuals are more likely to reduce 
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insurance coverage when informal support through redistribution requests is available. 
A second factor that may affect transfers through both the moral hazard and risk 
sharing channels is wealth. Wealthier farmers may be more vulnerable to redistribution 
requests. However, they are also less likely to rely on informal transfers for financial 
stability (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2014; Ligon, Thomas & Worrall, 2000). They may 
thus abstain from participating in the informal network and be less likely to reduce 
WTP due to a fear of free riding. By the same logic, and given their higher expendable 
income, wealthier farmers may also be less likely to share a policy with peers. Less 
wealthy farmers, on the other hand, may commit to greater moral hazard due to 
financial vulnerability. 
 
To summarise, informal transfers are expected to affect weather insurance take-up 
through different channels. Depending on utility equations and farmer characteristics, 
two stylised expectations are proposed:  
 
1. Informal transfers motivated by moral hazard are expected to decrease weather 
insurance take-up. A farmer is less likely to purchase insurance when he can 
request redistribution transfers from his peers. Farmers that are concerned 
about redistribution pressure from free riding peers are also less likely to 
purchase insurance. 
 
2. Informal transfers motivated by informal risk sharing to try out a new policy 
will lead to an increase or decrease in weather insurance take-up, contingent 
upon the amount of insurance that would have been purchased without access 
to informal transfers.65 
 
The next section presents an experimental design to empirically examine these 
theoretical expectations in a laboratory setting. 
                                                     
65 While outside the scope of this study and likely to be a secondary effect, informal transfers 
motivated by informal risk sharing to mitigate low levels of basis risk will increase weather 
insurance take-up. 
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2.3 Experimental design 
 
To measure the extent to which informal transfers affect weather insurance take-up, I 
conducted a second framed field experiment with smallholder farmers in Gujarat. This 
experiment elicited farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for hypothetical insurance 
products while varying rights to make transfers. Though the external validity of a lab 
experiment is more limited than a field experiment, a lab setting offers valuable insights 
into the research topic at hand by facilitating a cleaner analysis. It would not be 
feasible to prohibit informal transfers in a real-world setting and, concomitantly, 
examine the interactions of formal insurance with distinct types of informal transfers.66  
 
With these advantages in mind, this lab experiment was conducted with a sample of 
290 smallholder farmers from the Ahmedabad district in Gujarat.67 Participants for the 
experiment were recruited through assistance from Taluka Development Officers and 
Sarpanch (block and village level government representatives). All participants (i) grow 
cotton, (ii) own between 1 and 10 acres of land, (iii) are at least 18 years old and (iv) 
live within 10 km of a rainfall station. 
 
To ensure a clean treatment effect, networks were artificially simulated in the 
experiment by grouping together farmers with similar socio-economic backgrounds. To 
reduce the risk of shared winnings via informal transfers among participants after the 
lab, participants were matched into groups of three with farmers from other blocks that 
they had never met. The external validity of the findings thus plausibly extend, at a 
minimum, to networks with low social capital (which have shared norms, values and 
attitudes but limited social trust) in developing countries with collective societal norms 
to support peers.  
                                                     
66 As discussed in Essay 1, such an experiment should also offer important lessons by simulating 
real world decisions with similar ethical considerations, peer scrutiny and high financial stakes 
(Levitt & List, 2007). 
67 As discussed in Essay 1, Gujarat offers an ideal case for exploring this topic as one of the main 
hubs for weather insurance sales in India. 
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I expect that common socio-economic characteristics within the sample (such as wealth 
levels and cultural backgrounds) also strengthen network effects in this experiment 
through a more generalised form of trust. While several studies suggest that network 
effects are strongest when trust is nurtured through repeated interpersonal interactions 
(e.g., Fafchamps, 2004), Platteau (1994) emphasises that a more generalised form of 
trust can be fostered through general knowledge about the population’s background. 
Consistent with this, Munshi (2004) finds that information linkages are weaker in 
heterogeneous populations. Moreover, a number of studies highlight the importance of 
common characteristics in strong network effects. For instance, Foster and Rosenzweig 
(1995) find that farmers respond more to information from peers with similar wealth 
levels, common clan membership, age and gender. Conley and Udry (2010) suggest that 
common growing conditions and credit arrangements also matter.  
 
As discussed in Essay 1, this experiment was held in a temporary experimental 
laboratory in Ahmedabad, India in March and April 2013.68 Each individual interview 
lasted approximately two hours and had four components: a Binswanger lottery game 
to measure risk preferences, this experiment on weather insurance take-up, a second 
experiment on ex-post investment decisions69 and a series of follow-up questions to 
collect data on participants’ characteristics and decision-making processes in the lab. 
The order of the two experiments (on take-up and investment decisions) was 
randomised across the sample to control for the risk that playing one game first might 
affect decisions in the second.70 
  
                                                     
68 A time of year in which cotton farmers have fewer fieldwork responsibilities. 
69 See Essay 1. 
70 Refer to Essay 1 for further information on lab setting, the Binswanger lottery and participant 
earnings. 
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2.3.1 Experiment overview 
 
The central component of this experiment is a series of Kharif season simulation rounds 
in which farmers are asked to make decisions about purchasing insurance. As laid out in 
the conceptual framework, the timing of each round is as follows:7172   
   
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 
Give 
endowment 
Present 
insurance 
Elicit 
WTP 
Introduce 
weather 
Reveal earnings & 
insurance payout 
Allow transfers 
(in “Transfer”) 
End. Go 
to t=0 
 
To determine an unbiased estimate of the effect of informal transfers on willingness to 
pay for formal insurance, small variations in this timing are introduced by randomly 
assigning participants to one of the following two treatments: (i) “No Transfer” (NT) 
and (ii) “Transfer” (T). In the “No Transfer” treatment, no informal transfers are 
allowed amongst group members. In the “Transfer” treatment, participants have an 
opportunity to engage in informal transfers with other group members in each round. 
These transfers can be used to share the cost of an insurance premium, an insurance 
payout and/or farm earnings. The rest of this section details the timing of events and 
differences in this timing across the two treatments. 
 
  
                                                     
71 See Appendix I – Phase 4 for experiment script example. 
72 Prior to commencing the game, these instructions are explained in great depth to each 
participant individually. Questions to test comprehension are posed periodically throughout the 
instructions. 
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t=0 Give endowments  
Each farmer is allotted one acre of land and an endowment of 18,600 Game Rupees 
(Rs). In each round, participants start with a zero balance and are given a new 
endowment of Rs 18,600. Immediately after receiving the endowment each participant 
has to pay Rs 15,000 for agricultural inputs. The remainder of the endowment can be 
used to purchase insurance and/or added to the final earnings for the round. 
 
t=1 Present the insurance 
Participants are presented with an actuarially fair insurance policy with a face value of 
Rs 3,600 and a set payout of Rs 10,800. Participants are told that this policy will be 
offered for a discounted random price between Rs 0 and Rs 3,600.73  
 
Participants are then given an opportunity to discuss the insurance product with the 
other two interviewees. In “Transfer”, this discussion is also an opportunity to make an 
informal risk sharing arrangement (i.e. to agree to share earnings or one or more 
insurance products through informal transfers at the end of the round). 
 
t=2 Elicit WTP for insurance 
Next, participants’ valuation of the insurance product is measured using the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, 1964). The BDM 
game, as it is more commonly called, helps to elicit each participant’s true valuation of 
the insurance product. To play the game, the participant first formulates a bid for the 
insurance policy. If the bid is greater than a random price generated by the computer, 
the participant has to purchase the policy. If the bid is lower than the random price, 
the participant cannot buy the policy. The BDM game is played privately, but 
participants have to announce their bid and whether or not they purchased insurance 
after all group members have played. 
                                                     
73 As weather insurance products are still relatively new in India, they are normally subsidised 
and sold under face value to increase take-up rates. 
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t=3 Randomly introduce shock (probability 1-p = .33) or no shock 
(probability p = .67) 
When a shock occurs (1-p = .33), it affects the entire group, but to varying degrees.74 
  
t=4 Reveal income earned and insurance payout (if relevant) 
Income earned varies across the group - ranging from Rs 500 to 7,500 when there is a 
shock and Rs 25,000 to 35,000 when there is no shock.  
 
Insurance payouts are a set value of Rs 10,800, independent of losses suffered. As shocks 
are measured at a central rainfall station, insurance payouts are not perfectly correlated 
with individual level losses.75 This experimental design focuses on scenarios in which the 
farmer suffers a loss and receives an insufficient payout, thus assuming a more limited 
form of basis risk than has historically characterised many weather insurance products. 
Importantly, as the component of basis risk depicted in this experiment is constant 
across the two treatment groups, it should not influence the treatment effect. 
 
Once income and insurance payouts have been distributed, participants must announce 
their true earnings to the group. 
 
t=5 Allow transfers (in “Transfer” only) 
Participants in “Transfer” can informally reallocate earnings and insurance payouts 
amongst themselves if they so wish. Transfers can be arranged at this time or have been 
organised at t=1 through an ex-ante arrangement to informally share an insurance 
policy.76 Participants in “No Transfer” proceed directly to t=6.  
 
                                                     
74 The three farmers have the same expectation about basis risk. They don’t know whether 
others are closer or further from the rainfall station. 
75 A detailed explanation of this limited component of basis risk is given in an informational 
session about the weather insurance product before the game begins. 
76 For instance, one farmer may purchase the policy with an informal agreement that his peers 
will make transfers for part of the premium cost or will receive part of the payout less the 
premium in the event of a shock. 
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t=6 Individuals with income above Rs 9,000 start again at t=0 if a white 
ball is selected 
The minimum number of rounds in this game is one and the maximum number of 
rounds is eight. Participants are not aware that the game is limited to eight rounds. At 
the end of each round, the group continues to the next round with a probability of 67%: 
if a white ball is drawn from a bag containing two white balls and one violet ball 
(Fischer, 2013).  
 
If the game continues, players with less than Rs 9,000 are not allowed to participate in 
the subsequent round. This rule incentivises participants in “Transfer” to give transfers 
at the end of each round as a means to mobilise financial support for future rounds. 
Peers that did not engage in informal transfers in previous rounds may be punished by 
being excluded from transfers when they fall beneath the Rs 9,000 threshold 
themselves.77  
 
In summary, the only difference in the timing of events across the two treatment groups 
is whether or not informal transfers are allowed at t=5 (Table 2.1). Farmers have an 
opportunity to discuss the insurance product in both treatments, but those in 
“Transfer” can also utilise this informal discussion period to make informal risk sharing 
arrangements. 
  
                                                     
77 While one may argue a shortage of social trust in the lab environment because participants do 
not know each other prior to arrival, ex-ante arrangements made during discussions at t=1 are 
overseen by the interviewers. Moreover, as previously mentioned, participants have an incentive 
to build a relationship with group members from whom they may need assistance in subsequent 
rounds.  
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Table 2.1 Summary of treatments 
 
 
 
This experimental design facilitates exploration of key predictions relating to the 
implications of informal transfers for weather insurance take-up. Comparing the two 
treatments is expected to capture the effect of transfers through both the moral hazard 
and informal risk sharing channels. The experiment is designed such that purchasing 
insurance is the welfare maximising choice for farmers with expected utility preferences. 
It is not possible to overinsure. Thus, the only incentive to reduce the level of formal 
coverage when given the opportunity to exchange informal transfers in “Transfer” 
would be moral hazard. If moral hazard dominates, I expect WTP to be lower in 
“Transfer” than in “No Transfer”. This will arise if some individuals give lower 
insurance bids with the intention of asking peers for transfers if a shock occurs. In turn, 
those who are afraid of pressure to give transfers to free riders may also give lower 
bids.78  
 
If farmers do not have expected utility preferences, I expect informal risk sharing to try 
out a policy will dominate the overall effect. Access to transfers will then lead to an 
increase or decrease in WTP. Similarly, if participants are unsure about weather 
insurance and want to test it out, the difference across treatments will capture diverse 
bids by individuals that made agreements with group members to purchase a policy 
                                                     
78 Unfortunately, it is not possible to disentangle the effect of moral hazard from the effect of 
fear of free riding or wealth effects on risk aversion in this experimental design. This would offer 
an interesting area for further research. 
Insurance discussion 
with peers                     
t=1
Public elicitation 
of WTP           
t=2
Public announcement 
of income realisation 
t=4
Informal 
transfers       
t=5
No Transfer (NT) x x x
Transfer (T) x x x x
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together. Whether this increases or decreases WTP depends on how likely individuals 
are to purchase insurance independently without transfer rights.79  
 
To disentangle the effect of the moral hazard and informal risk sharing channels, I 
record all informal transfers between group members and ask follow up questions at the 
individual level about what motivated each transfer and when it was arranged. 
Transfers that were arranged before playing the WTP game are categorised as informal 
risk sharing arrangements. Transfers that were arranged after a shock occurred are 
categorised as redistribution arrangements and may be due to moral hazard. This data 
is cross-referenced across each pair for accuracy. 
 
2.4 Experimental results 
 
This section presents the empirical strategy undertaken to analyse the implications of 
informal transfers for weather insurance take-up. First, I discuss the descriptive 
statistics for my sample. Then, I present my analysis of the treatment effect on 
willingness to pay for insurance. This is followed by a discussion of mechanisms through 
which transfers may affect take-up and several robustness checks. 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The results presented in this study are based on 564 rounds of the take-up game, played 
by 290 farmers.80 Summary statistics overall and disaggregated by treatment group for 
several key farmer and household characteristics are presented in Table 2.2 at the 
individual level. The average age of participants was 43 and the majority of participants 
had completed less than 7 years of schooling. The average plot size is five acres. Most 
farmers had not heard of weather insurance prior to the experiment. 
                                                     
79 Some participants may also be willing to pay marginally more because they can share payouts 
to mitigate basis risk. However, this is not anticipated to be a primary effect, as the level of 
basis risk in the experimental design is quite limited. 
80 Of the 294 individuals surveyed after the pilot stage, 4 were excluded from this analysis (2 
with incomplete control variable data and 2 that would not play the Binswanger lottery). 
Inclusion of these observations does not change the results significantly. 
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Table 2.2 also shows differences in means across treatment groups. For nearly all of the 
farmer and household characteristics, the difference in means across treatment groups is 
not statistically different from zero. The only unbalanced observable is gender, though 
it is not noteworthy in percentage terms: 100% of “No Transfer” are men and 96% of 
“Transfer” are men.81  
 
The number of statistically significant differences is consistent with what we would 
expect from a random allocation across treatments. In an F-test of joint significance of 
all covariates, I do not reject the hypothesis that the covariates are jointly uncorrelated 
with treatment assignment (p=0.42). No covariates are significant at the 10% level or 
lower when regressing treatment assignment on all covariates and clustering at the 
group level. This provides confidence in the integrity of the randomisation and suggests 
this sample has balance on unobservables. 
  
                                                     
81 Controls are included in the regression analysis to address this difference. 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics 
 
All Farmers No Transfer (NT)
1
Transfer (T)
1
NT vs. T
2
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Gender (1= Male) 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.04**
(0.14) (0.00) (0.20) (0.02)
Age (years) mean 42.57 42.42 42.72 -0.30
(13.05) (12.99) (13.15) (1.54)
                   median 42.00 42.00 43.00
Education
Illiterate 0.19 0.16 0.22 -0.06
(0.39) (0.36) (0.41) (0.05)
Class 1 to 7 0.42 0.47 0.37 0.09
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.06)
Class 8 to10 0.29 0.26 0.31 -0.05
(0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.05)
Class 11 to 12 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02
(0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.03)
Graduate 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.02)
Weather insurance familiarity
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.02)
0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.13) (0.16) (0.08) (0.02)
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.02)
Participant has not heard of weather insurance. 0.93 0.92 0.94 -0.02
(0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.03)
Plot size (acres) mean 5.10 5.04 5.16 -0.11
(2.44) (2.49) (2.40) (0.29)
                         median 5.14 4.57 5.14
Landowner 0.90 0.89 0.91 -0.03
(0.30) (0.32) (0.28) (0.04)
Village distance from Ahmedabad (Km) 88.76 90.03 87.45 2.58
(24.58) (25.46) (23.66) (2.94)
Caste
        Scheduled Castes (SC) 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.02
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.03)
        Scheduled Tribes (ST) 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.01)
        Other Backward Classes (OBC) 0.59 0.59 0.60 -0.02
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.04)
        Other 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.01
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.04)
Decision Parameter
Estimate of Coefficient of Partial Risk Aversion 1.20 1.14 1.26 -0.12
(1.98) (1.90) (2.06) (0.23)
Experience of weather risk / Rainfall risk exposure
Experienced drought in last 3 years 0.43 0.42 0.45 -0.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.06)
0.39 0.39 0.39 0.00
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.06)
0.54 0.55 0.54 0.01
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.06)
Number of observations 290 148 142
Note 1: standard deviations in ( ); 2: standard errors of differences in ( ); 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Participant has heard of the product, but does 
not understand what it is for or how it works.
Know someone that has received a payout from 
any  insurance (weather, crop, life, health, etc.)
Participant understands the product perfectly.
Participant understands the product somewhat.
Have bought at least one other form of agricultural 
insurance
80 
 
A first look at the dependent variable, willingness to pay (WTP), is presented in Table 
A2.1. In both treatments, WTP increased as rounds progressed. Interestingly, mean 
WTP was higher in “No Transfer”, but median WTP was higher in “Transfer”. Figures 
1 and 2 help to unpack this contrast: 14% more “Transfer” participants were not willing 
to pay anything for insurance than “No Transfer” participants (Figure 2.1). Of the 258 
observations in “Transfer”, 41 made zero bids. In “No Transfer”, on the other hand, 
only 6 out of 306 observations made zero bids. The density plot in Figure 2.2 also 
reveals that more participants in “No Transfer” have higher WTP. 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of WTP across treatments 
 
“No Transfer”                          “Transfer” 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Kernel density by treatment 
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2.4.2 Main analysis 
 
This section presents regression analyses to explore whether these differences across 
treatments in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are statistically significant and through which 
channel(s) these effects may transpire. The following ordinary least squares regression is 
first employed to test the effect of informal transfers on willingness to pay for insurance 
using linear and non-linear specifications. 
 
 =   +  	 +  +  +   +   +  +                     (2.1) 
 
Yij equals the willingness to pay for insurance for individual i in group j. Tj is equal to 
one for individuals in “Transfer” and zero otherwise, Ri is an individual measure of risk 
aversion, Pi is an individual measure of plot size, TjRi is the interaction effect between 
“Transfer” and risk aversion, TjPi is the interaction effect between “Transfer”   and  
plot size,  Xij   represents  a  vector   of   individual-level   baseline 
control variables and εij is the error term. 
 
The interaction with risk aversion is included to explore whether treatments have 
varying effects according to individual risk preferences. In particular, less risk averse 
individuals may be more likely to free ride through redistribution requests (Janssens & 
Kramer, 2014; Fischer, 2013). Participant plot size is used as a measure of wealth and is 
interacted with the treatments as less wealthy individuals are more likely to rely on 
wealthy peers for financial support and thus may be more affected by access to informal 
transfers (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2014). Moreover, wealthy individuals may have a 
greater fear of free riding or may exit the informal network. 
 
The other controls are gender; a dichotomous variable equal to one if all group members 
are of the same caste; round number; education level; religion; and playing the 
investment game/take-up game first. Errors are clustered at the group level. 
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In this regression, B1
 
captures the main treatment effect and is positive or negative 
depending on which mechanism dominates. If B1
 
is positive, this indicates that the 
dominant channel through which informal transfers affect WTP is informal risk sharing 
to try out a policy. If B1 is negative, this could be driven by moral hazard or informal 
risk sharing to try out a policy. As previously mentioned, follow up questions at the end 
of the experiment are used to disentangle these channels further. I expect B2 will be 
positive if moral hazard is higher among less risk averse individuals. As more risk averse 
individuals are less likely to free ride on their peers, the difference across treatments (as 
captured by B1) is expected to decrease as risk aversion increases. Lastly, B3 will be 
positive if individuals become less reliant on informal transfers as wealth increases or 
negative if wealthier individuals fear free riding from their peers. 
 
Table 2.3 presents the first set of OLS regressions. The left panel focuses on the 
dependent variable WTP. The negative coefficient across all specifications suggests that 
either moral hazard or risk sharing to try out a policy are the dominant channel. 
Columns 1 and 2 present the effect of “Transfer” on WTP without and with controls, 
respectively (relative to the base category, “No Transfer”). In Column 3, interaction 
terms with risk aversion and plot size are included. The “Transfer” coefficient increases 
in size from Column 2 to 3 and is now significant at the 5% level. In line with 
expectations, this suggests that, holding all other factors constant, access to informal 
transfers is associated with a Rs 497 decrease in WTP among farmers with a one acre 
plot. As plot size increases, this difference declines, suggesting that moral hazard is 
higher among the financially vulnerable. 
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Table 2.3 OLS regressions: impact of transfer rights on WTP 
Treatment effects relative to base category: No Transfer (NT) 
 
 
 
As access to informal transfers may only affect a subset of individuals or may not have 
a linear relationship with WTP, the right panel of Table 2.3 explores the effect of 
transfer rights on definitive decisions not to purchase insurance. Using a linear 
probability model, the dependent variable is collapsed into a dichotomous variable 
equal to one if WTP>0 and zero otherwise. In these regressions, “Transfer” is negative 
and significant at the 1% level across all specifications. Column 5 presents my preferred 
specification with the inclusion of controls to increase precision: the “Transfer” 
coefficient suggests that the predicted probability of bidding more than Rs 0 is 14% 
lower in “Transfer” than in “No Transfer”. In other words, transfers lead to a reduction 
in willingness to bid for insurance. The risk aversion control variable is also now 
significant, indicating that an increase in risk aversion is associated with an increase in 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfer (T) -162.33 -154.26 -564.42** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.23***
(175.88) (155.57) (248.71) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
T*Risk Aversion 51.30 0.01
(46.41) (0.01)
T*Plot size 67.16* 0.01
(40.44) (0.01)
Risk Aversion 27.83 2.12 0.01** 0.00
(20.88) (31.34) (0.00) (0.00)
Plot size 30.42 -0.73 0.01 0.00
(19.69) (22.97) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 2,171.24*** 2,947.04*** 3,104.25*** 0.98*** 1.05*** 1.08***
(111.49) (587.17) (591.30) (0.01) (0.19) (0.19)
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
R-squared 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.10
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
Note 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
WTP Dichotomous variable = 1 if WTP>0
Note 1: The other controls are gender, same caste, round number, education, religion, and playing 
the investment game/take-up game first (omitted from the table).
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WTP>0. Including interaction terms with risk aversion82 and plot size in Column 6 
increases the size of the “Transfer” coefficient to -0.23, but the interaction terms are not 
significant.  
 
Lastly, the regressions in Table 2.3 also indicate that WTP is affected by several 
statistically significant control variables. In line with expectations, higher WTP is 
associated with higher education levels, higher round numbers, higher risk aversion 
levels and all group members having the same caste level (in at least one specification). 
The control for religion is also negative and significant in several specifications, 
indicating that Hindus are willing to pay less than Muslims or Jains. However, given 
the small number of non-Hindus in this sample, this finding should not be weighted 
heavily. 
 
As noted in Essay 1, it is also useful to focus the analysis on participants that made 
efficient choices in the Binswanger risk preference game as they may be more likely to 
take the take-up game more seriously. The regressions in Table 2.3 are presented in 
Table A2.3 excluding participants that selected Binswanger Gambles D and F. While 
the sample size decreases, the “Transfer” coefficient remains significant at the 5% level 
or lower in Columns 3 and 6 and increases marginally in size across all specifications.  
 
As the dependent variables WTP and WTP>0 are not continuous, it is also 
appropriate to use alternative specifications to the standard OLS approach. The left 
panel of Table 2.4 employs an ordinal logit specification to take into account that the 
dependent variable WTP is measured in increments of 100 between 0 and 3,600. For 
ease of interpretation, I present the ordinal logit regression in Column 3a as odds ratios. 
                                                     
82 The distribution of risk preferences is presented in Table A2.2. The sample is relatively well 
distributed across the risk spectrum, though slightly more risk loving than in previous studies. 
Approximately 8% of the farmers in this study selected the riskiest lottery, Gamble H, which is 
high in comparison to the less than 2% that selected this gamble in Binswanger (1980) and low 
levels in similar games by Holt and Laury (2002). Participant comprehension of the Binswanger 
lottery was tested carefully in this study, so it is unlikely that lack of understanding is driving 
this trend.  
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Consistent with the OLS regressions in Table 2.3, the treatment effect is negative and 
only significant with the introduction of interaction terms in Column 3, which indicates 
that transfers reduce WTP among individuals with small plot sizes.  
 
Table 2.4 Ordinal logit and logit: impact of transfer rights on WTP 
Treatment effects relative to base category: No Transfer (NT) 
 
 
In the right panel of Table 2.4, I run the same regressions using a logit model and the 
dependent variable equal to one if WTP>0 and zero otherwise. All specifications in this 
panel are significant at the 1% level. Odds ratios in Column 6a suggest that, holding all 
other factors constant, the odds of being willing to pay more than Rs 0 are 16.7 times 
higher for farmers in “No Transfer” than farmers in “Transfer”. 
 
Collectively, the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicate that informal transfers crowd out 
Ord Logit Ord Logit Ord Logit Odds Ratio Logit Logit Logit Odds Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (3a) (4) (5) (6) (6a)
Transfer (T) -0.12 -0.16 -0.95** 0.39 -2.25*** -2.26*** -2.86** 0.06
(0.29) (0.27) (0.46) (0.18) (0.55) (0.57) (1.33) (0.08)
T*Risk Aversion 0.08 1.07 -0.15 0.86
(0.08) (0.09) (0.24) (0.21)
T*Plot size 0.13* 1.14 0.15 1.16
(0.08) (0.09) (0.21) (0.25)
Risk Aversion 0.03 -0.01 0.99 0.19* 0.33 1.39
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.21) (0.29)
Plot size 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.08 -0.04 0.96
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.20) (0.19)
Constant -2.45*** -3.77*** -4.20*** -4.20*** 3.91*** 2.95* 3.45* 31.43
(0.24) (1.10) (1.15) (1.15) (0.47) (1.59) (1.99) (62.44)
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 564
Controls NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Wald 0.19 . . . 16.65 33.97 41.21 41.21
Pseudo R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
Note 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dichotomous variable = 1 if WTP>0
Note 1: Other controls are gender, same caste, round number, education, religion, and playing the 
investment game/take-up game first (omitted from the table). Education is excluded from the logit 
regressions because it perfectly predicts several observations. Exclusion of this variable does not 
significantly change the coefficients of interest.
                 WTPDependent variable:
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demand for formal insurance for some individuals. Farmers are less likely to buy 
insurance when it is possible to give and receive transfers. However, this effect is most 
pronounced at lower levels of willingness to pay and among individuals with smaller 
plot sizes. Indeed, this heterogeneity is consistent with the earlier discussion about the 
distribution of WTP in Figure 2.1. These findings thus qualify the conclusions of 
Dercon et al. (2014) and Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2012), highlighting the importance of 
contextual factors and indicating that informal transfers reduce take-up in the context 
of limited idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2.4.2.1 Group-level trends 
 
Further insights into the relationship between informal transfers and formal insurance 
can be seen in trends at the group level. A preliminary exploration of descriptive 
statistics first reveals that the average standard deviation of WTP within the group is 
higher in “Transfer” than in “No Transfer” (Table A2.4). The average standard 
deviation of final earnings within the group is also higher in “Transfer”, indicating that 
informal risk sharing is incomplete. The average transfer given in “Transfer” was quite 
low: Rs 1,250. In 197 of 258 (76%) “Transfer” observations, no transfers took place at 
all. Among the remaining 24% that did engage in informal transfers, some made 
reciprocal transfers that were returned in subsequent rounds.83  
 
To explore these group level trends further, the following OLS regression tests the effect 
of transfers on the dispersion of WTP within the group: 
 
 =   + 	 +  +  +  +                                  (2.2)      
 
                                                     
83 A handful also made large transfers to group members for expenses such as purchasing a 
tractor, which actually increased disparities in income across the group and can partly explain 
the low level of risk sharing overall. The low level of transfers may also in part be attributed to 
informal arrangements to make reciprocal transfers that were interrupted because the game 
ended with a 33% probability in each round. 
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where Vj equals the level of variance in WTP for group j. Tj is equal to one for groups 
within “Transfer” and zero otherwise, Wj is the average WTP of the group, TjWj is the 
interaction effect between “Transfer” and average WTP of the group,84 Xj 
represents  a  
vector  of  average  baseline  control  variables and εj is the error term. 
Controls include gender; a dichotomous variable equal to one if all group members are 
of the same caste; plot size; risk aversion; round number; education level; and insurance 
associations. 
 
Employing this regression in Table 2.5, Column 1 first reveals that “Transfer” is 
associated with higher variance in WTP and is significant at the 5% level without 
interaction terms. Including interactions in Column 2 increases the magnitude of the 
coefficient, though the significance level falls to 10%. In Columns 3 and 4, variance in 
the number of people that are willing to bid WTP>0 is also greater in “Transfer” and 
significant at the 1% level. Whether these trends are due to moral hazard or informal 
risk sharing remains an open question to be explored in the next section. 
 
  
                                                     
84 This variable is divided by 1,000 to enable interpretation in the table. 
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Table 2.5 Variance in WTP within the group 
Treatment effects relative to base category: No Transfer (NT) 
 
 
2.4.3 Suggestive evidence on mechanisms 
 
To isolate the channel through which transfer rights reduce willingness to pay, 
participants were asked at the end of each interview when each transfer had been 
arranged – before playing the WTP game (ex-ante) or after the weather condition was 
revealed (ex-post). This information was matched across participants to confirm that 
the same answers were given for each transfer. According to participants, only 7-14% 
(5-10 out of 70) of transfers were arranged ex-ante while 86-93% (60-65 out of 70) of 
transfers were arranged ex-post.85 This evidence indicates that the moral hazard channel 
is the dominant driver behind the higher number of zero bids in “Transfer” than in “No 
Transfer”, i.e. that moral hazard significantly reduces take-up on the extensive margin. 
Among the 10 transfers that were arranged ex-ante, 7 of these groups arranged for one 
individual to purchase a policy while their peers gave Rs 0 bids (and informally 
                                                     
85  Five observations could not be matched, perhaps due to an ambiguous risk sharing 
arrangement. 
Transfer (T) 532,191.16** 936,214.10* 0.08*** 0.24***
(235,241.77) (473,486.50) (0.02) (0.05)
T * Average WTP -196,940.60 -0.08***
(187,722.81) (0.02)
Average WTP -96,903.12 7,758.38           -0.05*** -0.01
(101,413.64) (109,843.75) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 5,819,051.33*** 5,564,781.95*** 0.41** 0.30*
(1,671,030.52) (1,664,288.56) (0.17) (0.17)
Observations 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.37 0.43
Note 4: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(4) Variance in 
WTP>0
(3) Variance in 
WTP>0
(2) Variance in 
WTP
(1) Variance in 
WTP
Note 3: Average WTP is divided by 1,000
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
Note 1: The other controls are gender, same caste, plot size, risk aversion, round 
number, education, and insurance associations (omitted from the table).
Dependent 
variable
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transferred a contribution toward the premium cost thereafter). This suggests that some 
groups were also sharing a single policy through informal risk sharing. However, they 
are in the minority.  
 
Breaking the data down by round also helps to provide further evidence on the channels 
through which transfers affect take-up. Table 2.6 thus runs the regressions separately 
with observations from Round 1 in the left panel and Round 2 onwards in the right 
panel. As in Chapter 1, I also include one additional control in regressions for Round 2 
onwards: the average occurrence of drought is used as a proxy for subjective beliefs 
about drought risk in the current season.86  
 
If participants want to try out the policy to learn about it, I expect the “Transfer” 
coefficient in Table 2.6 to go toward zero over time as participants develop trust in the 
providers and better understand the product. However, the statistically significant 
negative effect on WTP only appears from Round 2 onwards. Moreover for WTP>0, 
the coefficient only declines from 0.23 to 0.22 from Round 1 to Round 2 onwards. These 
trends help to rule out the informal risk sharing channel and provide further support for 
the conclusion that moral hazard reduces weather insurance take-up. 
 
  
                                                     
86 The occurrence of drought in the experiment was fairly uniform across treatments and across 
rounds. Overall, “No Transfer” participants experienced relatively fewer droughts (Table A2.5). 
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Table 2.6 OLS regressions by round 
Treatment effects relative to base category: No Transfer (NT) 
 
 
Table 2.6 also offers useful robustness checks for the empirical analysis. A first concern 
in this analysis is that events in earlier rounds (such as weather or earnings levels) 
might affect participant behaviour in later rounds. The left panel of Table 2.6 explores 
this possibility by limiting the analysis to the cleanest data: observations from the first 
round. In Column 1, the regression for the dependent variable WTP has a consistent 
sign with earlier results, but it is not significant (which could be attributed to the small 
sample size in these regressions). Using WTP>0 as a dependent variable in Column 2 
also reveals consistent findings with earlier regressions, namely a negative coefficient 
and statistically significant difference between “No Transfer” and “Transfer”. 
 
Dependent variable: (1) WTP (2) WTP > 0 (3) WTP (4) WTP > 0
Transfer (T) -382.60 -0.23** -707.38** -0.22**
(318.76) (0.09) (269.46) (0.08)
T*Risk Aversion 45.47 0.02* 51.27 0.00
(48.46) (0.01) (78.25) (0.01)
T*Plot size 21.13 0.01 81.78 0.01
(47.05) (0.01) (50.25) (0.01)
Risk Aversion 47.10 0.01 -39.55 0.00
(32.82) (0.00) (45.79) (0.01)
Plot size -0.58 0.00 17.02 0.00
(27.96) (0.01) (34.01) (0.01)
Constant 2,730.05*** 0.94*** 2,851.57*** 1.32***
(786.87) (0.24) (1,054.11) (0.18)
Observations 290 290 274 274
Controls YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.13
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
Note 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 1: Other controls are gender, same caste, round number, education, 
religion, playing the investment game/take-up game first, and a weather 
perception proxy (in Columns 3 and 4) (omitted from the table).
Round 1 Round 2 onwards
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A second possible concern is that data from the first round may be subject to higher 
measurement error if participants did not fully understand how the game works. 
Though such a concern is unlikely due to in-depth instructions and comprehension 
testing, the right panel of Table 2.6 explores this concern by excluding observations 
from the first round.  
 
The results from Round 2 onwards are also consistent with my main findings. The 
“Transfer” coefficient in Column 3 is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
Interestingly, the size of the coefficient is higher and only significant from Round 2 
onwards, suggesting that learning may indeed matter in understanding the game. This 
difference across rounds may also be driven by growing fear of free riding as 
participants get to know their peers over the course of the game. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Drawing together the literatures on formal-informal insurance interactions and on 
redistribution norms, this framed field experiment yields key findings for our 
understanding of low weather insurance take-up. First, in contrast to the findings of 
Dercon et al. (2014) and Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2012) for high basis risk, this study 
indicates that informal transfers reduce take-up in the context of limited idiosyncratic 
risk. Consistent with expected utility preferences, the main finding of this study is that 
the primary channel through which this substitutive relationship transpires is moral 
hazard. When farmers have the ability to give and receive transfers, they are less likely 
to purchase at any price. Moreover, a decrease in willingness to pay is pronounced 
among individuals with smaller plot sizes. In terms of scholarly implications, this 
research thus highlights an important distinction between transfers for risk sharing to 
try out a policy versus transfers due to redistribution pressures that has previously been 
less well defined in the economics literature.  
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This research also provides important policy lessons on how weather insurance should 
be marketed and structured in order to maximise the potential productivity-enhancing 
benefits of insurance coverage. One possible tool to address the dampening effect of 
moral hazard on take-up is to focus the expansion of weather insurance in areas where 
redistribution norms are less pronounced. Alternatively, one could mandate all or none 
purchases when weather insurance is sold to groups. Group weather insurance is still in 
pilot stages and some have suggested that group policies should be sold to microfinance 
groups, because it would be easier to sell within existing structures. In such contexts, 
the effect of moral hazard may be exacerbated without appropriate regulation as group 
members know each other well and can exert redistributive pressure on insured peers. 
Moral hazard could be reduced by introducing a requirement that everyone in the group 
has to purchase a policy. However, as shown in Essay 1, group insurance may raise 
other potential challenges. Moreover, an all-or-none requirement might reduce overall 
take-up depending on whether a majority of members are interested in purchasing. 
Exploring these cut-off points and interactions would thus be a noteworthy area for 
further research. 
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Essay 3: Networks, self-protection and moral hazard  
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
Self-protection technologies play an important role in rural development by helping to 
reduce risk exposure. Yet, in spite of such benefits, adoption levels are varied. An open 
question is whether networks can help us to understand this variation. A number of 
papers have studied the role of networks in facilitating knowledge sharing and diffusion 
of other forms of technology (e.g., Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; Bandiera & Rasul, 2006). 
What is less well understood, however, is whether networks may also affect take-up of 
self-protection technologies through their provision of informal insurance. Individuals 
rely on peers for informal transfers in the face of financial shocks - particularly in areas 
with limited access to formal financial tools (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). Akin to the 
pattern of moral hazard identified in formal insurance markets (e.g., Arnott & Stiglitz, 
1991; Essay 2), access to this financial support from peers may distort incentives to 
invest in self-protection due to moral hazard. This study provides empirical support for 
such a proposition and suggests that such informal transfers crowd out investment in 
self-protection tools.  
 
To explore the extent to which moral hazard reduces self-protection investments, this 
study focuses on the case of soil conservation. Soil conservation is a fundamental self-
protection strategy against short- and long-term production risk such as weather 
variability. Yet, in many developing countries, only a small share of smallholder farmers 
invest in low cost soil conservation methods such as bunding and levelling. In the case 
of India, bunding and levelling were utilised by only 9% and 16% of the rural 
population respectively in 1999 (NCAER, 1999). As there are multiple alternative risk 
mitigation tools available and farmer production functions and utility functions are 
unknown, it is difficult to discern whether these usage levels are optimal. According to 
Di Falco and Bulte (2012), members of kin constrain investment in soil conservation in 
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Ethiopia. However, the linkages between other types of networks and self-protection 
investments remain less well defined.  
 
Complementing Essay 2’s experimental findings on formal insurance, this study takes a 
non-experimental approach to unpack the interaction between redistribution norms in 
caste networks87 and investment levels in traditional forms of self-protection in rural 
India. Normally, this would be a difficult issue to study. However, a basic conceptual 
framework and intuition point to clear and testable contrasting effects on self-protection. 
In particular, conditional on household income, this framework predicts that increases 
in average network income lead to decreases in self-protection investments due to moral 
hazard. In contrast, conditional on average network income, increases in household 
income are expected to increase investments in self-protection due to a relaxed credit 
constraint.  
 
The National Council of Applied Economic Research Rural Economic and Demographic 
Survey (NCAER REDS) data – a national rural household survey – in 1982 and 1999 
offers a unique setup to test this prediction that household and network income have 
opposing effects. Using a panel dataset, I am able to sidestep endogeneity concerns such 
as time-invariant unobservables by focusing on within-household changes in income and 
self-protection. To address the risk of time-variant unobservables and simultaneity bias, 
I also implement an instrumental variable strategy by instrumenting for changes in 
income with inherited land in 1982.  
 
The main analysis of this study supports the idea that self-protection is reduced by 
moral hazard in the context of redistribution norms. While increases in household 
income are associated with small average increases in self-protection, increases in 
average network income are associated with notable decreases in self-protection. In 
particular, a 1% increase in average caste income is associated with a 0.01 p.p. decrease 
                                                     
87 A primary source of informal transfers in India (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2009; 2014). 
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in the probability of both levelling and bunding. This decline is consistent with the 
prediction that informal transfers crowd out investment in self-protection.  
 
While recognizing it is not possible to test for all possible endogeneity concerns, this 
analysis provides a first look and does not rule out the theory that caste networks 
reduce investment in self-protection due to moral hazard. In particular, these findings 
provide several contributions. First, they offer useful preliminary insights for our 
understanding of moral hazard for self protection and suggest that network effects 
extend beyond the kinship unit. They also expand our understanding of network 
externalities for risk-related technology adoption. Lastly, this study starts to shed light 
on the long-term effects of networks on self-protection decisions by utilising a long-term 
panel and focusing on changes in permanent income. 
 
The primary policy recommendation arising from this work is the need for further 
exploration of aggregate effects and heterogeneity within the relationship between 
informal transfers and self-protection as alternative data sources become available. In 
particular, measuring moral hazard in datasets with shorter time horizons, for 
alternative self-protection tools and with detailed data on risk preferences and wealth 
levels would help to bolster these findings. Exploring the extent to which access to 
credit reduces these effects would also be an interesting direction for future research. 
 
The rest of this essay is organised as follows. First, I review the literature in the context 
of a simple conceptual framework on networks, self-protection and moral hazard. I then 
present the empirical strategy and discuss the results before concluding with academic 
and policy implications. 
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3.2 Related literature and theoretical motivation 
 
Many scholarly works have studied the interactions between networks and decision-
making of the poor. Some studies have highlighted the benefits of network effects for 
social learning and the diffusion of new technologies (e.g. Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995). 
Others have pointed to potential variations in such effects. For instance, Bandiera and 
Rasul (2006) suggest some farmers strategically wait to adopt new crops in order to 
benefit from peer experience once a large number of other farmers in the network have 
tested the technology. 
 
A number of papers have also explored the implications of redistributive norms for risk-
mitigating efforts. Most focus on decisions to purchase formal insurance products, the 
findings of which appear context-specific. Several studies suggest that the opportunity 
to exchange informal transfers can reduce formal insurance take-up due to moral hazard 
(e.g., Arnott & Stiglitz, 1991). Indeed, Jannsens and Kramer (2014) find evidence of 
free riding among less risk averse individuals who purchase less health insurance in a 
lab experiment in Tanzania and Essay 2 finds similar trends in the case of weather 
insurance. Other studies have shown, however, that networks increase the purchase of 
formal weather insurance when there are high levels of basis risk (Dercon et al., 2014; 
Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2012). 
 
Drawing on these mixed findings, an important question is whether moral hazard also 
affects the adoption of self-protection tools. Ligon (1998) finds evidence of moral hazard 
within some village networks in South India. Di Falco and Bulte (2012) also suggest 
that redistribution norms foster a free riding culture and lead to lower adoption of soil 
conservation efforts among members of kin in Ethiopia. However, quantifying the 
degree of moral hazard in self-protection for other types of networks that extend beyond 
village borders is more limited. 
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To that effect, this study focuses on the caste network, a prominent risk-sharing group 
in rural India. While a number of studies have concentrated on the village as the 
informal risk sharing group of interest, the caste network is better placed to insure 
against aggregate level shocks and is increasingly viewed as a more relevant unit for 
informal insurance in practice. For instance, Mazzocco and Saini (2012) find evidence of 
higher levels of risk sharing at the caste level than the village level in rural India.88 
Indeed, informal loans from caste members are quite sizeable – making up 14% of the 
total value of loans received by households in rural India – and are disproportionately 
used to cover consumption and emergency expenses. 25% of households participated in 
informal transfers with caste members in 1982 and 20% in 1999 (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 
2009). As shocks do not necessarily occur in all years, these percentages are noteworthy. 
In view of the prominence of caste networks as a source for informal transfers, this 
study focuses on caste as the primary network unit.89 
 
To further motivate an exploration of the interactions between caste networks and self-
protection, the following basic conceptual framework lays out potential implications of 
increases in household and network income for such investments. 
 
  
                                                     
88 Fafchamps and Lund (2003) also assert that informal risk sharing is more prominent in the 
network of friends and relatives than the village network in the Philippines. 
89 To reduce measurement error, I also exclude observations in castes with fewer than 15 
households or with household heads less than 18 years old (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2009). 
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3.2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
Consider a simplified world with the following timing of events: 
 
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 
Begin season 
with 
endowment e 
Discuss 
investment 
Make 
investment 
decision 
Introduce 
weather 
Reveal 
earnings 
Exchange 
informal 
transfers 
End. 
Go to 
t=0 
 
• At t=0, farmer i in network j has a land endowment e on which he grows wheat. 
The farmer’s income y is subject to high variability due to fluctuations in local 
rainfall conditions.  
• At t=1, farmer i is presented with a self-protection tool with cost c and given the 
opportunity to discuss the product with other farmers in the network. Farmer i is 
risk averse and follows a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The 
natural prediction is that he will decide to invest in self-protection because his 
expected utility is higher with actuarially fair self-insurance. 
• At t=2, each farmer in the network decides whether or not to purchase the self-
protection tool. This decision is public and simultaneous across the network.  
• At t=3, a random weather condition is then introduced. 
• At t=4, income earned is introduced. Income varies across the network, ranging 
from ysl to ysh when there is a shock and ynl to ynh when there is no shock.  
• At t=5, the farmers have an opportunity to engage in informal transfers within the 
network. 90 
• Lastly, at t=6, the farmers return to t=0: this is a repeated game. 
 
Building on a theoretical model by Alger and Weibull (2010), such an environment may 
lead farmer i to reduce investments in self-protection by fostering moral hazard. One 
way to illustrate this is to consider the implications of an exogenous positive shock to 
                                                     
90 The farmers do not have access to formal insurance. 
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the average income of the network. This shock increases the network’s capacity to 
provide farmer i with a transfer in the event of a negative income shock. The 
opportunity for moral hazard through lower investments in self-protection is thus 
increased. If he experiences a negative shock to income, he can ask wealthier members 
of his network for a transfer at t=5. 
 
This framework thus offers a first testable prediction: conditional on farmer i’s income, 
an increase in average network income leads to a decrease in investment in self-
protection due to moral hazard.  
 
An increase in farmer i’s income, on the other hand, is expected to offer a contrasting 
effect on self-protection efforts. Economic theory suggests that a direct effect of an 
increase in farmer income is that it relaxes the farmer’s credit constraint and thus 
facilitates higher investment in self-protection. In line with theory, several empirical 
studies have shown that investments in formal insurance, for instance, increase as 
wealth increases (e.g. Gine et al., 2008; Gine & Yang, 2008).  
 
However, one could envision this effect to be limited by two factors. First, an increase 
in income may also lead to a declining sensitivity to risk. Assuming Decreasing 
Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) preferences, the farmer may become less risk averse as 
wealth increases. Such an effect would thus dampen the positive effect of household 
income on investment in self-protection tools. 
 
A second potential limitation on this increase in investment is a fear of free riding (Di 
Falco & Bulte, 2011; Baland et al., 2009; Grimm et al., 2013; Alger & Weibull, 2010). A 
farmer who would otherwise engage in self-protection may also reduce his efforts for 
fear of free-riding peers in the network. This is because of a cultural obligation to share 
income informally with the network when financial success is public knowledge. 
Recognition that one may cover the full financial costs of self-protection while reaping 
only part of the benefits is expected to put a downward pressure on investments. 
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Indeed, this is consistent with the theoretical model of de Janvry et al. (2014) for 
formal weather insurance: a farmer will not purchase insurance if he anticipates that his 
peers will not purchase insurance and attempt to free ride on his policy. Such 
predictions may thus also hold for investments in self-protection. 
 
In spite of these potential downward pressures,91 the overarching effect of an increase in 
household income leads to the following second prediction: conditional on average 
network income, an increase in household income will increase investments in self-
protection by relaxing the credit constraint. This prediction thus stands in direct 
contrast to the negative effect of network income on self-protection. 
 
3.3 Empirical analysis  
 
This section discusses the main empirical analysis to test the abovementioned 
predictions, beginning with the identification strategy and main specification, followed 
by descriptive statistics, then the main estimates and, finally, robustness checks. 
 
3.3.1 Identification strategy and specification  
 
To explore the implications of networks for self-protection efforts, I use the National 
Council of Applied Economic Research Rural Economic and Demographic Survey 
(NCAER REDS) in 1982 and 1999. As informal risk sharing is a prominent practice in 
India (Townsend, 1994), this rural panel household survey offers an important case for 
exploring the issue at hand. Data was sampled in 16 major states: 250 villages are 
included, with 4979 households in 1982 and 7474 households in 1999. The increase 
across rounds is due to the inclusion of surveys from split-off households that 
partitioned after the 1982 round as well as some new households.  
 
To construct a balanced panel from the NCAER REDS, data from split-off households 
in 1999 are averaged and matched with the 1982 observations. Due to data limitations, 
                                                     
91 Disentangling these channels falls outside the scope of this paper. 
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it is not possible to track self-protection practices on individual plots of land over time. 
Average values are thus used for 1999 split-offs to avoid overweighting households that 
may exhibit similar behaviour in risk-related decisions. 
 
This REDS dataset includes information on income, self-protection investments and a 
number of household and farm characteristics such as education levels and plot 
information. For the independent variable, I focus on agricultural income 92 in the 
previous survey year as a primary measure of income – both at the household level and 
averaged at the network level. While a more comprehensive measure would also be 
useful, inconsistencies in the survey design across rounds preclude use of such a variable 
without introducing significant measurement error.  
 
For the dependent variable, one could choose from a wide range of self-protection tools 
available to smallholder farmers in rural India. This study focuses specifically on two 
common, low-cost investments that can help to reduce production risk. First, levelling is 
an agricultural technique used to standardise the level of topsoil, either manually by 
dragging a beam across the plot or with a laser land levelling technology.93 Levelling can 
be implemented for large areas of land or can be used to even out contours on a slope. 
It is typically – though not exclusively - employed for crops that benefit from level 
basin irrigation (for instance, wheat or rice). Levelling reduces production risk by 
ensuring a more uniform application of water, thus decreasing the farmer’s dependency 
on irrigation between 10% and 30%. Levelling can also reduce long-run production risk 
by preventing salt concentrations and land degradation (Lybbert, Magnan, Spielman, 
Bhargava & Gulati, 2013; Abdullaev, Ul Hassan & Jumaboev, 2007).94   
 
                                                     
92 Pro-rated by household size. 
93 Laser levelling is increasingly popular in India and is commonly subsidised (Lybbert et al. 
2013). 
94 While most studies highlight the soil conservation benefits of this technique, some suggest it 
can also lead to soil erosion in certain cases by changing surface soil characteristics (Martinez-
Casasnovas & Ramos, 2009). 
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The second self-protection technique, bunding, involves placing stones around the 
contours of a slope. Bunding reduces production risk by increasing soil moisture and 
protecting against soil erosion. Soil erosion is a particularly important risk to 
production levels on hilly plots as it weakens soil nutrients and increases water runoff. 
In sum, levelling and bunding are low-cost tools for mitigating production risk by 
reducing dependency on water availability through more efficient irrigation and by 
promoting soil conservation. 95  To test the effect of increases in income on self-
protection, dichotomous variables equal to one if household i invested in the prior year 
and zero otherwise are generated separately for levelling and bunding.  
 
As the analysis relies on a panel dataset, I eliminate the effect of any unobserved time-
invariant factors that may affect the dependent variable. Without a panel, the 
coefficients of interest may be biased. For instance, the gradient of a farmer’s plot may 
affect decisions to invest in bunding. Moreover, risk preferences – which are correlated 
over time – are also an important determinant of self-protection investments and could 
bias cross-sectional results. By focusing on changes within households from 1982 to 1999 
in a fixed effects model, I can remove such time invariant unobservables. 
 
  
                                                     
95 When used according to plot characteristics and crops grown. 
103 
 
To explore the implications of networks for investment in self-protection, I thus employ 
the following regression equation:96 
 
∆ =  	∆ + ∆ + ∆                                (3.1) 
 
where ∆  is the change in self-protection from 1982 to 1999; ∆ is the change in 
household income; ∆ is the corresponding change in average income of the rest of the 
caste and ∆ is the change in unobserved determinants of self-protection for household i 
at time t.    
 
I expect that conditional on household income, an increase in average caste income 
should decrease household investment in self-protection (due to crowding out by 
informal transfers) (B2 < 0). Conditional on average caste income, however, an increase 
in household income is expected to increase household investment in self-protection due 
to an improved financial capacity (B1 > 0).97 Thus, comparing the difference in signs 
across network and household effects is expected to capture any effects of moral hazard 
on investment choices. 
 
However, a remaining concern with this strategy is that unobserved time-variant factors 
could still affect the dependent variable and thus bias the estimated effects of changes 
in household income and caste income. For instance, improvements in local access to 
credit between 1982 and 1999 could lead to increases in income and could also facilitate 
higher investments in self-protection due to strengthened financial capacity. There is 
also a risk of simultaneity bias, as increases in self-protection may lead to increases in 
average income. 
 
                                                     
96 Adapted in part from Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009; 2014). 
97 Though this effect may be limited due to a fear of free riding or DARA effects. 
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An instrumental variable (IV) approach is best applied to address these remaining 
endogeneity concerns. 98  Following Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009; 2014), I employ 
inherited land at the household level and average inherited land at the network level as 
IVs. As inherited land introduces a permanent change in wealth, this IV can be 
interpreted as the causal impact of permanent anticipated changes in income on 
changes in self-protection. In terms of the compliers, I expect changes in average 
network income to affect everyone in the sample that has inherited land and engages in 
informal transfers within the network. Moral hazard may be particularly pronounced 
among poorer households that have lower financial capacity and thus a more 
constrained ability to invest in self-protection. It may be less pronounced among 
wealthier households who are more likely to have exited the informal insurance 
arrangement.  
 
Inherited land by the head of household offers a plausible valid instrument for changes 
in income. As an exogenous positive shock, it is a strong predictor of changes in income 
from 1982 to 1999. Importantly, as a historical instrument, it should overcome the risk 
of reverse causality. Moreover, as land is rarely sold in rural India,99 inherited land is 
expected to be uncorrelated with the dependent variables (changes in levelling and 
bunding) other than through its correlation with change in income. 
 
To test the strength of this IV and any remaining concern of omitted variable bias, I 
run robustness checks at the end of this section. A primary concern is that the 
exclusion restriction may be violated if there are other channels through which inherited 
land affects self-protection. For instance, households with more inherited land may also 
have higher levels of education and thus are better able to understand and invest in 
more self-protection. As my main regression focuses on the effect of changes in income 
on changes in self-protection, education levels are unlikely to be a concern. Moreover, 
such a concern is not likely to bias the household and network coefficients in the 
                                                     
98 As well as the concern of measurement error in the income data. 
99 Less than 3% of all households sold land between 2000 and 2005 (according to the India 
Human Development Survey (IHDS), Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2009). 
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opposing directions that I predict. However, I include education levels of the household 
head – as well as other additional regressors – to check the robustness of these results. 
While acknowledging that some risk of omitted variable bias may still remain, this 
analysis offers a useful first look by giving the hypothesis (that networks crowd out self-
protection due to moral hazard) a chance to fail.  
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3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample in 1982 and 1999. As illustrated, 
investments in levelling and bunding were 3% and 8% respectively in 1982 but 
increased substantially to 9% and 16% in 1999. Average income grew from Rs 834 to Rs 
3,559 over the same period (per household individual).100 Average inherited land was 
693 acres in 1982.  
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
100  Within castes, income inequality also increased 42% over this time period (Munshi & 
Rosenzweig, 2014). 
1982 1999
Risk mitigation measures
Levelling 0.03 0.09
(0.17) (0.29)
Bunding 0.08 0.16
(0.27) (0.36)
Income measures
Household income 833.62 3,558.96
(1,291.73) (11,223.55)
Grow non-basin irrigation crops 0.69 0.29
(0.46) (0.44)
Other descriptive statistics
Plot size (acres) 719.30 616.84
(1,043.68) (951.16)
Inherited land (acres) 692.93
(1,033.60)
Note 1: standard deviations in ( ).
Note 2: Statistics computed for castes with >15 households and with 
household heads >18 years old in 1982
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3.3.3 Main estimates 
 
To explore the implications of changes in income on investments in self-protection, OLS 
regressions are first presented in Table 3.2. In line with expectations, an increase in 
household income is associated with a statistically significant increase in bunding and 
levelling. However, the effect of an increase in caste income is more mixed: it is 
associated with a statistically significant decrease in bunding, but it has no effect on 
levelling. As time variant unobservables – such as changes in access to credit – may 
bias these coefficients, the rest of this section focuses on the instrumental variable 
estimates.  
 
Table 3.2 OLS regressions 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 presents reduced form regressions. The coefficient of household inherited 
land101 is positive and significant at the 5% level for changes in levelling in Column 1. 
This suggests that household inherited land is positively correlated with increases in 
levelling between 1982 and 1999. However, household inherited land is insignificant in 
Column 2 for changes in bunding.  
                                                     
101 Inherited land is measured in acres divided by 10,000 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for ease of 
presentation. 
Dependent variable:
(1) Change in 
levelling
(2) Change in 
bunding
0.12*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.04)
0.07 -0.15***
(0.04) (0.05)
Constant 0.04*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2,964                        2,964                          
R-squared 0.017 0.007
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Change in log household income
Change in log caste income
Note 1: Robust standard errors in ( ).
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The main coefficient of interest, average caste inherited land, is negative and significant 
at the 1% level for both bunding and levelling. In line with expectations, these results 
support the idea that households in castes with more inherited land engaged in less self-
protection. 
 
Table 3.3 Reduced form regressions 
 
 
First stage parameters are estimated in Table 3.4 for the two main independent 
variables: change in log household income and change in log caste income in Columns 1 
and 2, respectively. In line with expectations, the coefficients of household inherited 
land and average caste inherited land are positive across both specifications. Apart from 
household inherited land in Column 2, all coefficients are significant at the 1% level. In 
Column 1, the coefficient of household inherited land indicates that a 100 acre increase 
in inherited land is associated with a 0.6% increase in household income. A 100 acre 
increase in average caste inherited land is associated with a 1% increase in caste income 
(Column 2). The large F-statistics and low p-values in both columns suggest these 
instruments have sufficient power.  
Dependent variable:
(1) Change 
in levelling
(2) Change 
in bunding
0.17** -0.06
(0.08) (0.12)
-0.64*** -1.37***
(0.15) (0.23)
Constant 0.08*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2,961          2,961          
R-squared 0.006 0.015
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 1: Robust standard errors in ( ).
Household inherited land
Average caste inherited land
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Table 3.4 First stage regressions 
 
 
Building on these first stage results, instrumental variable estimates are presented in 
Table 3.5. These estimates support my main prediction that an increase in network 
income is significantly correlated with a reduced probability of investing in levelling and 
bunding. The coefficient of change in log caste income is negative and significant at the 
1% level in both specifications. This means that – holding other factors constant – a 1% 
increase in average caste income is associated with a 0.008 and 0.013 p.p. decrease in 
the probability of levelling and bunding, respectively. As previously mentioned, these 
IV estimates can be interpreted as the causal impact of permanent anticipated changes 
in income on investments in levelling and bunding. Given that self-protection rates were 
already quite low in 1982 (3% and 8% in levelling and bunding, respectively), this 
downward pressure on adoption is noteworthy.   
 
  
Dependent variable:
(1) Change in log 
household income
(2) Change in log 
caste income
0.57*** 0.02
(0.12) (0.03)
0.70*** 1.03***
(0.18) (0.08)
Constant 0.02** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.00)
F-stat 1 54.0 115.5
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 2,961                               2,961                           
R-squared 0.046 0.073
Average caste inherited land
Household inherited land
Note 1: Robust standard errors in ( ).
Note 3: Household income is prorated by household size.
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5 Second stage regressions 
 
 
In line with expectations, change in log household income is also significant at the 10% 
level and positive in Column 1. This suggests that increases in household income are 
associated with increased investments in levelling. In contrast, change in log household 
income is not significant in Column 2. This is consistent with the reduced form results, 
and suggests that the instrument household inherited land is not well correlated with 
changes in bunding investments.  
 
Overall, the positive and negative coefficients for household and caste income 
respectively are consistent with the predictions that informal transfers crowd out self-
protection. Several alternative theories can be proposed, but they do not align with 
these diverging signs. For instance, if we assume networks engage in full risk sharing, 
one would expect an increase in network income to also increase household investments 
in bunding and levelling. However, this story is not consistent with the empirics. Such a 
theory is also negated by Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2009) rejection of the model of full 
risk sharing using the NCAER panel. Alternatively, one may expect that farmers have 
DARA preferences and become less risk averse as wealth increases; this would result in 
a negative coefficient for changes in log household income, which is also not borne out 
in the data.  
Dependent variable:
(1) Change 
in levelling
(2) Change 
in bunding
Change in log household income 0.32* -0.07
(0.17) (0.21)
Change in log caste income -0.83*** -1.28***
(0.24) (0.32)
Constant 0.19*** 0.32***
(0.03) (0.05)
Observations 2,964           2,964           
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 3: Household income is prorated by household size.
Note 1: Robust standard errors in ( ).
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A third alternative theory could be that an increase in the network’s average inherited 
land also increases the network’s capacity to provide informal credit for households to 
invest in their farms. However, in such a scenario, one would not expect change in log 
caste income to have a positive coefficient. This would also conflict with Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2014)’s finding that the caste network provides support primarily for 
consumption and cash flow emergencies such as illness rather than for loans to further 
investment. 
 
Lastly, one may be concerned that wealthier farmers have better land quality and thus 
require lower investments in bunding, for instance. However, as land is rarely sold in 
India (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2009), this is also unlikely to be captured in a fixed 
effects regression that focuses on the effect of changes in income.  
 
3.3.4 Robustness checks 
 
In this section, I conduct robustness checks to explore several outstanding uncertainties 
and rival explanations in this analysis. A first concern may be that the observed effects 
are driven by differences in education levels. As wealthier households are more educated 
on average, they may be more likely to start investing in self-protection and to share 
this knowledge amongst themselves. While such an effect is less likely to be captured in 
a measure of change in investments from 1982 to 1999, it is still possible that this effect 
would introduce an upward bias on my coefficients and lead me to underestimate the 
downward pressure of caste income on investments in self-protection.  
 
A second potential bias that could arise is that split-off households may have younger 
household heads that are either more ambitious or less risk averse in technology 
adoption. This could also lead to an upward bias on the coefficient of change in log 
household income or change in log caste income.  
Lastly, it is important to consider that certain self-protection methods may be more or 
less effective depending on the type of crops grown. In particular, levelling is more 
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commonly used in large areas to improve the effectiveness of basin irrigation for crops 
such as rice and wheat. An increase in the growth of crops that require furrowing such 
as cotton, maize or sugarcane, on the other hand, is less likely to require investments in 
levelling. With the spread of high-yield varieties of cotton in India and the 
corresponding increases in income that this has generated, it is thus important to 
consider the effect of changes in crop choice on investments in self-protection.  
 
To address these potential concerns, I include the education of the household head, a 
dummy demarcating split-off households and a dummy demarcating change in 
production of non-basin irrigation crops (cotton, maize and sugarcane)102 as additional 
regressors in the IV estimates in Table 3.6. Inclusion of these controls increases the size 
of the main coefficient of interest in both columns: change in log caste income is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of change in log household 
income, on the other hand, is no longer significant in Column 1. While this raises some 
concern, it could be explained by the notable drop in sample size with the inclusion of 
controls. Overall, the instrumental variable approach is not perfect, but it is difficult to 
explain these results through alternative reasoning and this analysis does not rule out 
the idea that informal transfers crowd out investments in self-protection. 
 
                                                     
102  As highlighted in Table 3.1, planting of non-basin irrigation crops appears to have 
dramatically decreased from 1982 to 1999. This is likely due to measurement error because the 
response options changed across the two surveys. While the resulting signs in Table 3.6 are in 
line with expectations (negative and significant for levelling, insignificant for bunding), these 
should not be relied on too heavily. 
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Table 3.6 Second stage regressions with controls 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this study used a unique panel survey dataset to test the extent to which 
informal transfers crowd out investment in self-protection tools. The main finding of 
this analysis is that increases in network income lead to decreases in self-protection. 
This supports the idea that self-protection is reduced by moral hazard in the context of 
redistribution norms. While it should be acknowledged that endogeneity issues may still 
remain, these results are not consistent with alternative explanations. This study thus 
offers a useful first look given available data and provides an important extension of the 
informal insurance literature to the case of caste networks and self-protection.  
 
In view of the long-term benefits of soil conservation and other self-protection tools for 
rural development, it is worth considering potential policy implications of informal 
transfers crowding out self-protection. As several studies have found that insurance and 
credit are substitutes (e.g. Karlan & Zinman, 2011), one potential policy strategy to 
Dependent variable:
(1) Change in 
levelling
(2) Change in 
bunding
Change in log household income 0.20 -0.38
(0.23) (0.28)
Change in log caste income -0.97*** -1.83***
(0.28) (0.43)
Change in non-basin irrigation crops -0.04** 0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
Splitoff household dummy 0.04* 0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Education 0.02** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.17*** 0.41***
(0.04) (0.07)
Observations 1,993                 1,993                 
Note 3: Household income is prorated by household size.
Note 2: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 1: Robust standard errors in ( ).
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increase investments in self-protection is to further the availability of formal credit. 
This would thus provide an interesting avenue for future work.  
 
It should also be kept in mind that the effectiveness of such interventions may vary and 
targeting initiatives could prove beneficial. In particular, poorer members of a caste 
may be more responsive, as they may place greater reliance on informal insurance 
arrangements. To bolster this study’s findings on aggregate effects and to explore 
potential sources of heterogeneity that may benefit from targeting, further research is 
needed. In particular, future panel datasets covering shorter time horizons, alternative 
self-protection tools and detailed data on risk preferences and wealth levels would offer 
a fruitful direction for further exploration.  
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Appendix I – Experiment Script103 
 
Phase 1: Participant consent 
Give hard copy of consent form to the participant 
 
“Risk sharing mechanisms, access to information and investment choices” 
Laura Munro, London School of Economics and the Centre for Micro Finance 
Contact details for this study: --------- -----------  
 
The purpose of this study is to understand rural farmers’ circumstances and financial 
choices especially relating to insurance and investment choices. This study is a key 
element of the principal researcher’s doctoral research at the London School of 
Economics. It will also help in the design of future weather insurance products for 
farmers such as you. In the study, you will play a series of games in which you have the 
opportunity to earn real money. These games will simulate a series of Kharif104 seasons; 
each season you will be asked to either value an insurance product or choose an 
investment product. These choices and random variations in rainfall levels will 
determine your earnings for the game and your participation today. Your participation 
in this study will take about two hours. If you have any questions about the study, they 
will be answered for you. 
 
For your participation in the study, you will receive a minimum of Rs 150. You can 
earn up to a maximum of Rs 400 depending on how you perform in the games that we 
play. Lunch will be provided and your transportation costs to/from Ahmedabad will 
also be covered. 
 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary, and you may withdraw your 
participation or your data at any time without any penalty to you. You may decline to 
answer any question. 
 
Your data will be kept completely confidential by storing it in a password-protected file 
in a physically secure location. You will not be asked for any personally identifiable 
information. When the research is completed, all data files will be kept protected in a 
secure location by the principal researcher at the London School of Economics. 
 
I have read the description of this study, my questions have been answered, and I give 
my consent to participate.     Yes     No 
 
Village of participant: _____________ 
                                                     
103 This protocol has drawn on Stein and Tobacman (2011) and Fischer (2013) for several 
questions and instruction texts. 
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Today you will play three games, some of which have several rounds. We will play (1) 
one round of the black and white game and (2) then several rounds of a game called the 
blue game and (3) several rounds of a game called the red game.  
 
Phase 2: Binswanger lottery (the black and white game)  
 
OK, let’s start with the Black and White game. In this game, the amount of money you 
win is based on picking a coloured stone. We will put two stones in this pouch. One 
stone is white. The other is black. You will then choose one stone from the pouch 
without looking. 
 
If you pick the white stone you will win the amount shown in white. If you pick the 
black stone you will win the amount shown in black. 
Distribute project choice sheets and tokens. 
We will give you choices about which game you want to play. Look at the sheet in 
front of you. It describes eight games. The colour on the page tells you how much you 
win for each colour stone. If you play Game A, how much do you win if you pick the 
white stone? _____ 
You said 50 Rupees. That’s correct! 
How much do you win if you pick the black stone in Game A? _____ 
You said 50 Rupees. That’s correct! 
The choice is yours. There are no right or wrong answers. Note that this game will be 
played FOR REAL MONEY, so think carefully!  If you choose 'I don't know', you 
won't play the game and will not have the opportunity to win any extra money. 
 
Which of the following gambles would you prefer? 
a. Rs 50 for white, Rs 50 for black 
b. Rs 45 for white, Rs 95 for black 
c. Rs 40 for white, Rs 120 for black 
d. Rs 35 for white, Rs 125 for black 
e. Rs 30 for white, Rs 150 for black 
f. Rs 20 for white, Rs 160 for black 
g. Rs10 for white, Rs 190 for black 
h. Rs 0 for white, Rs 200 for black 
i. I don't know=9 
 
At the end of your session here today, you will be paid privately in rupees for your 
earnings in one of the rounds that you played today, either in the black and white 
game, the blue game or the red game. Suppose you play one round of the black and 
white game, three rounds in the blue game and five rounds in the red game. We will 
put one orange token for the black and white game labelled BW; three blue tokens 
labelled 1, 2, and 3; and five red tokens labelled 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the pouch and you 
will pick a token from the pouch without looking.  
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Let’s say that you select a blue token labelled with the number 3 (show token). This 
means that you will be paid your earnings for the third round of the take-up game. Do 
you have any questions about this? 
 
At the end of the day, you will be paid individually and privately. No one will see 
exactly how much you earn. 
 
Phase 3: Introduction to weather insurance 
 
Have you heard of weather insurance? Can you explain to me what it is? Rate 
comprehension. 
a. Participant understands the product perfectly. 
b. Participant understands the product somewhat. 
c. Participant has heard of the product, but does not understand what 
it is for or how it works. 
d. Participant has not heard of the product. 
  
Weather Insurance is an index based insurance product for the Kharif monsoon. This 
provides cover for financial losses arising due to deficient rainfall. The cover is operative 
during the monsoon months i.e. June to September. The sum insured under one policy 
is Rs 10,800. 
 
Here is a short video to introduce you to how weather insurance helps to protect a 
farmer against the risk of low income from drought. 
 
Show Video 
 
In this video we have seen: 
• Sukhiram explain how a farmer can reduce risk of income loss from drought 
• How weather insurance works. 
• How one can get a payout from weather insurance if suffering from deficit 
rainfall. 
 
Do you have any questions about what you just saw? 
 
Note down participant questions ________ 
Now we will give you a bit more detail about the specifics of the policy.  
In each district where weather insurance is sold, a primary rainfall station is chosen as 
the reference station. These stations are chosen on the basis of presence of consistent 
historical rainfall data, and are managed by the Indian Meteorological Department 
(IMD). 
 
There are 16 rainfall stations in the Ahmedabad district. You receive a payout if a 
drought is recorded at your local rainfall station. Everyone within a 10 kilometre radius 
125 
 
of the rainfall station that purchases weather insurance will receive the same payout of 
Rs 10,800 if there is a drought recorded at their local station. Using one location to 
determine payouts makes the product more affordable and ensures that you receive 
your payout faster. However, be aware that rainfall levels at this station are only an 
approximation of rainfall on your plot of land. So you may earn only Rs 500 from crop 
sales while another farmer earns Rs 7,500. While you suffered different losses, both of 
you will receive a payout of Rs 10,800 if you are insured. 
 
Do you understand?   Yes     No 
Do you have any other questions before we start the first game? ____________ 
 
Phase 4: Take-up game (the blue game)105 
 
This game is called the blue game. In the first part of each round, we want to see how 
much you value a weather insurance policy. In contrast to the other game you play 
today, the purchase of insurance is NOT mandatory in this game. The game works like 
this. First you have to state what is the maximum amount of money you would pay to 
have the weather insurance policy we just described. Then we will make a randomly 
drawn offer to sell it to you. If this offer is lower than the amount you said you would 
be willing to pay, then you pay the amount of our offer and take the insurance policy. 
If the amount we offer is higher than what you said you would be willing to pay, then 
you do not purchase the insurance policy and are uninsured this round. 
 
You will be best off if you state the real maximum amount you would be willing to pay 
to get the insurance policy. 
 
We will start by looking at a sample situation. Let's say Sutha is playing the game for a 
weather insurance policy. He states that the maximum amount he would pay for the 
policy is Rs 2,500.  He is then randomly offered the policy for Rs 2,600.  What 
happens? 
1. Sutha does not buy the weather insurance policy. 
2. Sutha pays Rs 2,500 for the weather insurance policy 
3. Sutha pays Rs 2,600 for the weather insurance policy. 
 
You answered Sutha does not buy the insurance policy. You're right! Since the bid of 
Rs 2,600 was higher than the Rs 2,500 that Sutha said he would be willing to pay, he 
does not buy the policy and is uninsured this round. 
 
Next let's look at another situation. Again, assume that Sutha says the maximum 
amount he would pay for the policy is Rs 2,500. However, this time he is randomly 
offered Rs 2,000 for the policy.  What happens now? 
                                                     
105
 The following script is for the "Transfer” treatment. Scripts for other treatment can be 
provided on request. 
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1. Sutha does not buy the weather insurance policy. 
2. Sutha pays Rs 2,500 for the weather insurance policy 
3. Sutha pays Rs 2,000 for the weather insurance policy. 
 
You answered Sutha pays Rs 2,000 for the insurance policy. You're right! Since the bid 
of Rs 2,000 was lower than the Rs 2,500 that Sutha said he would be willing to pay, he 
gives Rs 2,000 and takes the policy. 
 
In each round you will be offered a weather insurance policy like Sutha. You will then 
be asked the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay for this product. 
 
After giving your bid, you will be randomly offered a price at which you can purchase 
this product. The offer price will be somewhere in between Rs 0 and Rs 3,600. If this 
offer price is lower than the maximum price you said you were willing to pay for the 
product, you will pay the offer price and purchase the policy. If the offer price is more 
than your maximum, you will keep the product.  
 
It is in your best interest to think about each question thoroughly and give the actual 
maximum price you would be willing to pay! 
 
Please verify that you understand – Yes or No 
 
Let’s do a practice run. The results from this question will not affect your final 
payment. We are offering a weather insurance with a market price of Rs 3,600. The 
payout from this policy is Rs 10,800 in the event of a drought at your local rainfall 
station during the Kharif season. What is the maximum amount you would pay to have 
this insurance coverage? Our offer price will be between Rs 0 and Rs 3,600. Give your 
bid by placing this token on the corresponding amount. 
 
Give bid sheet and token to the participant. 
 
You said the maximum amount you’re willing to pay for this policy was: Rs ____ 
 
Your computer will now randomly select an offer price between 0 and 3,600 for this 
policy. The offer price is Rs ____. 
 
You get to buy the policy. You said the maximum amount you would be willing to pay 
was Rs ___. Our random offer of Rs ____ was smaller than the maximum amount 
you said you were willing to pay, so you get to buy the policy. 
 
Do you have any questions? Yes   No 
 
Valuing the weather insurance product is only one part of this game. Now let’s explain 
the timing of the rest of game. In this game, each participant owns one acre of land. 
The game will be comprised of several rounds – each round represents one Kharif 
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season. At the beginning of each round, you will be given Rs 18,600. One hundred game 
rupees are equal to one real rupee.  
 
Immediately after receiving the endowment of Rs 18,600 each participant will have to 
pay Rs 15,000 for agricultural inputs. The remainder of the endowment can be used to 
purchase insurance or can be allocated to your final earnings for the round. The face 
value of the insurance policy is Rs 3,600. This policy is actuarially fair and provides a 
payout of Rs 10,800 in the event of a drought. We may offer a random discount on this 
price – you can expect that our offer price will be between Rs 0 and 3,600.  
 
Before you decide how much you are willing to pay for this policy, you will be given an 
opportunity to talk with the other participants in your group. After this break, you will 
be asked for your willingness to pay for the insurance product. This valuation will be 
given publicly. All group members will know how much you are willing to pay for 
insurance and whether or not you are insured this round. 
 
Next, you will be told whether or not a drought occurs in this round. The probability of 
a drought occurring is 1 in 3 (33%). When a drought occurs, it affects the entire group, 
but to varying degrees.  
 
Then you will be told how much income you earned. Income ranges from Rs 500-7,500 
when there is a drought, and Rs 25,000-35,000 when there is optimal rainfall (no 
drought). In this game, average earnings in a drought are Rs 4,000. Average earnings in 
rainfall are Rs 30,000. 
 
You will have to tell your group members how much you earn. 
 
Insurance payouts are a standard value of Rs 10,800 for all members of the group that 
purchase an insurance policy. Payouts are determined at a rainfall station up to 10 
kilometres away; rainfall levels at this station are used to approximate rainfall on all of 
your plots of land, but it is not a perfect approximation. If there is a drought in this 
round, you may receive only Rs 500 in earnings while another group member earns up 
to Rs 7,500 from selling part of his crop. Though you suffered different losses, you will 
receive the same payout of Rs 10,800 if you are each insured in addition to your crop 
sales earnings. 
 
Do you understand? Yes     No 
 
After you receive your earnings and/or insurance payout, you will be allowed to make 
transfers with members of your group. You may want to give part of your earnings to 
another group member or to ask for a transfer yourself. You are only eligible to play in 
subsequent rounds if you have at least Rs 9,000 at the end of the round. If you have 
less than Rs 9,000 you will have to rent out your land at the end of this round in order 
to survive – the penalty for doing this is that you cannot play in the next round. Keep 
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in mind that if you suffer from a drought and do not have insurance or receive a 
transfer from your peers, there is a 70% chance that you cannot play in the next round.  
 
At the end of each round, your total earnings will be recorded. A ball will then be 
drawn from this bag (show bag) to determine whether or not there is a next round for 
all eligible players. This bag contains 10 white balls and 5 violet balls. If a white ball is 
drawn, the game continues and players with a balance of Rs 9,000 in the previous 
round are allowed to participate. These participants will start with a zero balance and 
then be given a new endowment of Rs 18,600. If a violet ball is drawn, the game ends 
for all players.  
 
We may play several rounds of this game and the next game. If one of the rounds from 
these games is selected for your final payment, we will pay you one real rupee for every 
100 game rupees that you scored in that round.  
 
If you earned Rs 30,000 in this round, how many real rupees would you be paid for this 
game? ______ 
 
You said Rs 300. That’s correct! 
 
Remember, every round counts but you will only be paid in real rupees for one of the 
rounds from these two games or the Black and White game. If the round chosen is one 
in which your group members played but you did not because you did not have 
sufficient points in the previous round, you will not receive any payment for this game  
 
Now let’s run the first round.  
 
Here is your endowment of Rs 18,600 for this round. Give participant game rupees. 
 
To prepare for planting this season, you must first pay Rs 15,000 for agricultural 
inputs. Everyone in the group purchases the same inputs. 
 
Exchange Rs 15,000 for input vouchers. 
 
The remainder of your endowment can be used to purchase insurance or can be saved 
for the end of the round. The probability of a drought occurring is one in three (33%). 
When a drought occurs, it affects the entire group, but to varying degrees.  
 
We are offering a weather insurance product with a market value of Rs 3,600. This 
policy pays out Rs 10,800 in the event of bad rainfall. What is the maximum amount 
you would pay to have this insurance coverage for the next Kharif round? Our offer 
price will be between Rs 0 and Rs 3,600. Take a moment now to think about how much 
you are willing to pay for this product.  
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Before you make your decision, we will have a brief break. You can discuss with your 
group members if you wish. Remember that you are allowed to ask what your peers 
think about weather insurance or to ask how much they plan to bid for the insurance 
product.  
 
At this time, you are also allowed to discuss with one or more of your group members 
whether you are interested in sharing your payouts through transfers at the end of the 
round.  
 
You don’t need to share any information or make any arrangements – this is entirely up 
to you. You can only play in the next round if you have Rs 9,000 at the end of this 
round. Keep in mind that if you suffer from a drought and do not have insurance or 
receive a transfer from your peers, there is a 70% chance that you cannot play in the 
next round. 
 
Your final bid will be collected publicly after this break. All group members will know 
how much you are willing to pay for insurance. They will also know whether or not you 
are insured and how much income you earn in each round. 
 
Give three minute break. Record discussion. 
 
OK the break is now over. Please return to your respective seats. 
 
Our offer price for this policy will be between Rs 0 and Rs 3,600. What is the maximum 
amount you would pay to have this insurance coverage for the next Kharif round? Give 
your bid by placing this token on the corresponding amount. 
 
Give bid sheet and token to the participant. 
 
You said the maximum amount you would be willing to pay for this policy was: Rs 
_____ 
 
Your computer will now randomly select an offer price between Rs 0 and 3,600 for this 
policy. The offer price is Rs ____. 
You get to buy the policy. You said the maximum amount you would be willing to pay 
was Rs ___.  Our random offer of Rs ____ was smaller than the maximum amount 
you said you were willing to pay, so you get to buy the policy. 
 
Give insurance policy. 
 
Now please announce to your group members how much you were willing to pay for 
insurance and whether or not you got insurance.  
 
Now, one member from your group will randomly select the weather conditions for this 
round. This bag contains three tokens: one for drought and two for optimal rainfall. 
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This means there is a one in three chance that your region will suffer from a drought. 
Player __, can you please choose a token from this bag?  
 
The weather for this period is: _____ Drought or Rainfall 
 
Show token to all participants 
 
Your earnings this period are: _____ 
 
Give corresponding game rupees.  
 
You purchased a weather insurance policy so you will also receive an insurance payout 
of Rs 10,800. 
 
Give corresponding game rupees. Announce earnings and insurance payout 
to other group members. 
 
Now you may have a break to discuss the season with your group members. If you wish 
to give any of your rupees to other participants, now is your opportunity to do so. 
Remember that you are only eligible to play in the next round if you have Rs 9,000 or 
more at the end of this round.  
 
Give three-minute break. Record discussion. 
 
What transfers did you give and/or take? 
 
1) Transfers given ____ to Player ___ 
 
2) Transfers given ____ to Player ___ 
 
3) Transfers taken _____ from Player ____ 
 
4) Transfers taken _____ from Player ____ 
Please count your final rupees for this round. You should have _____. Is this correct? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
a) Please rectify any discrepancies ______ 
 
Collect cash and tell farmer to write down their earnings. 
 
As you earned more than Rs 9,000 in this round, you are eligible to play again if there 
is another round. 
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Whether or not there is a next round depends on which ball is drawn from this bag 
containing 10 white balls and 5 red balls. If a white ball is drawn, the game continues. 
If a red ball is drawn, the game ends. 
 
Player __ please choose a ball from the bag without looking.  
 
Player __ selected a white ball so the game will continue for another round. 
 
 
Phase 5: Investment game (the red game)106 
 
In this game, each participant owns one acre of land. The game will be comprised of 
several rounds – each round represents one Kharif season. At the beginning of each 
round, each participant will be given an endowment of Rs 18,600. Immediately after 
receiving the endowment, each participant will have to pay Rs 10,000 for agricultural 
inputs (excluding fertiliser).  
 
The remainder of the endowment (Rs 8,600) is for purchasing insurance and fertiliser. 
In contrast to the other game you play today (the blue game), the purchase of 
insurance is mandatory in this game. This insurance policy has a face value of Rs 3,600 
per person and provides a payout of Rs 32,400 to the group in the event of a drought. 
We may offer a random discount on this price for the whole group, so the actual price 
that you have to pay will vary across rounds. 
  
After you have purchased your insurance coverage, you will be offered a choice between 
three different fertiliser products, with varying levels of risk and return. All investment 
products cost Rs 5,000: 
1) Low-risk, low-return fertiliser: average income is Rs 27,000 if optimal 
rainfall, average income is Rs 6,000 if drought 
2) Average-risk, average-return fertiliser: average income is Rs 30,000 if 
optimal rainfall, average income is Rs 3,500 if drought 
3) High-risk, high-return fertiliser: average income is Rs 31,000 if optimal 
rainfall, average income is Rs 2,000 if drought 
 
Each product has higher returns, and higher risk, than the last. Products with higher 
returns are particularly sensitive during drought years. Keep in mind that the 
probability of a drought occurring is one in three (33%). When a drought occurs, it 
affects the entire group, but to varying degrees. On average, individuals using high-risk 
fertiliser will have lower payouts in drought years than individuals using low-risk 
fertiliser. However, individuals using high-risk fertiliser are likely to have higher payouts 
                                                     
106
 The following script is for the "Group Perfect” treatment. Scripts for other treatments can be 
provided on request. 
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in optimal rainfall years than individuals using low-risk fertiliser. This is because the 
high-risk, high return fertiliser has more rigid rainfall needs. 
 
Before finalizing your fertiliser choice in each round, you will publicly announce your 
choice to your group members and have a few minutes to discuss this choice. At the 
end of this break, you will reveal your final choice publicly in front of your peers. 
 
Do you have any questions about the difference between these three products? 
a. Yes _________________ 
b. No 
 
Ask the farmer to explain the difference between these three products in 
their own words and rate their comprehension. 
 
After you have made your investment selection and paid for your insurance, you will be 
told whether or not a drought occurs in this round. Then, you will be told how much 
income you earned and whether you received an insurance payout. You will have to 
announce your income to the rest of the group at this time. Insurance payouts are a 
standard value of Rs 32,400 for the group as a whole. Upon receiving a payout, the 
group has a few minutes to decide how to distribute this internally among the group 
members. Payouts are determined at a rainfall station up to 10 kilometres away; 
rainfall levels at this station are used to approximate rainfall on all of your plots of 
land, but it is not a perfect approximation. If there is a drought, you may receive only 
Rs 500 in earnings this round while another group member earns up to Rs 7,500 from 
selling part of his crop. 
 
Do you understand?    Yes      No 
 
Ask if it is possible to have 500 rupee earnings in drought when own low-
risk fertiliser. 
 
After you have received your payout, you will be allowed to make transfers with 
members of your peer group. You may want to give part of your earnings to another 
group member or to ask for a transfer yourself.  
 
At the end of each round, your earnings will be recorded. A ball will then be drawn 
from this bag (show bag) to determine whether or not there is a next round. This bag 
contains 10 white balls and 5 red balls. If a white ball is drawn, the game continues. If 
a red ball is drawn, the game ends for all players. 
 
Now let’s run the first round. 
 
Here is your endowment of Rs 18,600 for this round. Give participant game rupees. 
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To prepare for planting this season, you must first pay Rs 10,000 for agricultural inputs 
(excluding fertiliser). Everyone in the group purchases the same inputs. 
 
Exchange Rs 10,000 for input vouchers. 
 
The remainder of your endowment is for purchasing insurance and fertiliser. Purchase 
of the insurance policy is mandatory. The probability of a drought occurring is one in 
three (33%). When a drought occurs, it affects the entire group, but to varying degrees. 
By purchasing insurance, your group is guaranteed a payout of Rs 32,400. You will 
have to decide amongst yourselves how to split up this amount when a drought is 
recorded at the local rainfall station. The face value of this policy is Rs 3,600 per 
participant. We may offer a random discount on this price, so you can expect that our 
offer price will be between Rs 0-3,600. 
 
Before you learn the price you will have to pay for insurance, you need to decide what 
kind of fertiliser you would like to apply on your land. We are offering a choice between 
three different fertiliser products, with varying levels of risk and return. All fertiliser 
products cost Rs 5,000.  
 
1) Low-risk, low-return fertiliser: average income is Rs 27,000 if optimal rainfall, 
average income is Rs 6,000 if drought 
2) Average-risk, average-return fertiliser: average income is Rs 30,000 if optimal 
rainfall, average income is Rs 4,000 R if drought 
3) High-risk, high-return fertiliser: average income is Rs 33,000 if optimal rainfall, 
average income is Rs 2,000 if drought 
 
Each product has higher returns, and higher risk, than the last. Products with higher 
returns are particularly sensitive during drought years. Keep in mind that the 
probability of a drought occurring is one in three (33%). When a drought occurs, it 
affects the entire group, but to varying degrees. On average, individuals using high-risk 
fertiliser will have lower payouts in drought years than individuals using low-risk 
fertiliser. However, individuals using high-risk fertiliser are likely to have higher payouts 
in optimal rainfall years than individuals using low-risk fertiliser. This is because the 
high-risk, high return fertiliser has more rigid rainfall needs. That said, your earnings 
are determined not only by your fertiliser choice but also by how much rain you 
received on your individual plot of land. As each player may receive different amounts 
of rain, it is impossible to know with complete certainty which fertiliser someone in 
your group chose simply by looking at their earnings.  
 
Before you choose your investment for this round, we will have a brief break. You can 
discuss with your group members if you wish.  
 
Give three-minute break. Record discussion. 
 
OK the break is now over. Please return to your respective seats. 
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Which fertiliser would you like to choose? Please announce this choice publicly to the 
entire group. 
 
You selected the ______ product, which will help you earn ____ on average if 
there is optimal rainfall and ____ on average if there is a drought. 
 
Take 5,000 game rupees and give corresponding fertiliser voucher. 
 
Now, your computer will randomly select an offer price between 0 and 3,600 per person 
for your insurance policy. The offer price is Rs ____ per person. Please pay this 
amount now. 
 
Take corresponding game rupees from participant and give insurance policy. 
 
Now, one member from your group will randomly select the weather conditions for this 
round. This bag contains three tokens: one for drought and two for optimal rainfall. 
This means there is a one in three chance that your region will suffer from a drought. 
Player ___, can you please choose a token from this bag?  
 
The weather for this period is: _____ Drought Rainfall 
 
Show token to all participants 
 
Your earnings this period are: _____. Please announce your earnings to the group. 
 
Give corresponding game rupees 
 
Your group will receive your insurance payout of Rs 32,400. You may now discuss 
amongst yourselves how to distribute this payout. 
 
Give corresponding game rupees and three minutes to distribute. Record 
discussion. ________ 
 
Now you may have a break to discuss the season with your group members. If you wish 
to give any of your rupees to other participants, now is your opportunity to do so. 
 
Give three-minute break. Record discussion. 
 
a. Transfers given ____ to Player ___ 
 
b. Transfers given ____ to Player ___ 
 
c. Transfers taken _____ from Player ____ 
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d. Transfers taken _____ from Player ____ 
 
Please return to your respective seats and count your final tokens for this round. You 
should have _____.  
 
Is this correct?     Yes   No          Please describe and rectify any discrepancies 
______ 
 
Collect cash and tell farmer to write down their earnings. 
 
Whether or not there is a next round depends on which ball is drawn from this bag 
containing 10 white balls and 5 violet balls. If a white ball is drawn, the game 
continues. If a violet ball is drawn, the game ends. 
 
Player __ please choose a ball from the bag without looking.  
 
Player __ selected a white ball so the game will continue for another round. 
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Phase 6: Follow up questions 
 
You will now be asked some basic questions about your experience, your life, your 
savings practices, needs, your experience with risk and insurance in this interview. 
 
The first few questions relate to the blue game (the take-up game) in which you were 
asked to value an insurance product. 
 
1. In Round _ of the blue game, you gave a transfer to Player __. When was this 
transfer arranged_?  
i. Before purchasing insurance 
ii. After the rainfall levels were revealed 
b. What motivated this transfer? ______ 
 
2. In Round _ of the blue game, you took a transfer from Player __. When was 
this transfer arranged_?  
i. Before purchasing insurance 
ii. After the rainfall levels were revealed 
b. What motivated this transfer? ______ 
 
3. Were you ever concerned that group members would not purchase insurance 
and then ask you for a transfer?  
a. Yes 
i. If yes, would you have been willing to pay more for weather 
insurance if uninsured peers could not ask for transfer requests? 
Yes / No / I don’t know 
b. No 
 
The next few questions relate to the red game (the investment game) in which you were 
asked to make investment choices. 
 
4. Do you think the method your group used to distribute payouts was fair?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
i. If no, how would you have done things differently? 
5. In Round _ of the red game, you gave a transfer to Player __. When was this 
transfer arranged_?  
i. Before purchasing insurance 
ii. After the rainfall levels were revealed 
b. What motivated this transfer? ______ 
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6. In Round _ of the red game, you took a transfer from Player __. When was 
this transfer arranged_?  
i. Before purchasing insurance 
ii. After the rainfall levels were revealed 
b. What motivated this transfer? ______ 
 
7. The most common fertiliser you chose in this game was ______. Why did 
you prefer this product? _________ 
a. I was attracted by the average high returns 
b. I knew I could ask for transfers if I earned low income 
c. I followed the fertiliser choices of Player 1,2,3 None ___ 
d. My group pressured me to choose this product 
 
8. In Round 1, you selected the ____ fertiliser. Why? ____________ 
 
9. In Round _, you changed your investment from ____ to ______. What 
prompted this change? __________ 
 
10. Did your group ever pressure you to choose a particular fertiliser?  
a. Yes   
i. If yes, how? ________ 
b. No 
 
11. The next question relates to the two games in general: If you were to take 
financial advice from someone in your group, which person would it be? 
a. Player 1 
b. Player 2 
c. Player 3 
d. I don’t know 
 
12. Did this player’s choices in the games affect your own choices: 
a. In the blue game 
i. Yes 
1. If yes, how? ______ 
ii. No 
b. In the red game 
i. Yes 
1. If yes, how? ______ 
ii. No 
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Now we have some general questions for you.  
 
13. What is your sex? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
14. What is the main tenancy agreement? 
a. I own my land and cultivate it myself 
b. 50/50 sharecropping – I am the owner 
c. 50/50 sharecropping – I am the tiller 
d. 75% owner/25% tiller – I am the owner 
e. 75% owner/25% tiller – I am the tiller 
f. 75% tiller/ 25% owner – I am the owner 
g. 75% tiller/ 25% owner – I am the tiller 
h. I work for a salary 
i. I don’t know 
j. Others=996 
 
15. What crops did you grow in the Kharif season 2012? 
a. CROP 1 ____ 
b. CROP 2 ____ 
c. CROP 3 ____ 
 
16. What is your household plot size (in bigha)?  ___________  
 
17. Have you adopted any new technologies in the last three years? Select all that 
apply.  
a. Irrigation 
b. Fertiliser 
c. Different seeds 
d. Other ___________ 
e. None 
 
18. Did you use irrigation for any of your Kharif season crops in 2012?   
a. Yes    
b. No 
 
19. Did you use fertiliser for any of the crops grown in the Kharif season 2012?    
a. Yes    
b. No 
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20. What is your religion? 
a. Hindu 
b. Muslim 
c. Jain 
d. Christian 
e. Other ___________        
 
21. What is your caste/community group? 
a. SC 
b. ST 
c. OBC 
d. Other  
 
22. What is your age? ___________ 
 
23. How many people are currently in your household? ___________              
                                          
24. Were you born in this village?     
a. Yes     
b. No 
i. If no, from where did you migrate?  Village, Taluka: 
___________ 
 
25. What level of education have you completed? 
a. Illiterate 
b. Class 1 to 7 
c. Class 8 to 10 
d. Class 11 to 12 
e. Graduate 
f. Post graduate 
g. Other ___________ 
 
26. How do you get news updates? Select all that apply: 
a. Family 
b. TV Channel  
c. Radio 
d. Friends 
e. Neighbours 
f. News Paper/ Magazines  
g. Internet 
h. PRI Officers 
i. Mass updates via mobile text message  
j. Other ___________  
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27. Roughly how much income could you gain from drawing on savings and selling 
assets during an emergency that costs Rs 15,000 (e.g., health, accident, etc.)? 
a. Rs 200-Rs 500 
b. Rs 500-Rs 1,000 
c. Rs 1,000-Rs 2,000 
d. Rs 2,000-Rs 5,000 
e. Rs 5,000-Rs 10,000 
f. More than Rs 10,000 
g. I don’t know 
 
28. Roughly how much money could you borrow (e.g., from banks, friends and/or 
informal moneylenders) if there was an emergency that costs Rs 15,000 (e.g., health, 
accident, etc.)?  
a. Rs 200-Rs 500 
b. Rs 500-Rs 1,000 
c. Rs 1,000-Rs 2,000 
d. Rs 2,000-Rs 5,000 
e. Rs 5,000-Rs 10,000 
f. More than Rs 10,000 
g. I don’t know 
 
29. What are the biggest risks to your income? Please identify the top two: 
a. Too much rain  
b. Not enough rain 
c. Timely availability of Inputs (Seed, Fertiliser, Pesticide) 
d. Variation in quality of Inputs (Seed, Fertiliser, Pesticide)  
e. Change in market prices from one year to another   
f. Crop disease                                                             
  
g. Animal hazard                                                           
  
h. Change in seed, fertiliser or pesticide prices from one year to another 
  
i. Other  
 
30. Do you know anyone who has ever received a payout from any form of 
insurance (weather, crop, life, health, accident, etc.)?     
a. Yes      
b. No 
 
31. Which of the following products do you most closely associate insurance with? 
a. A savings product 
b. An investment product 
i. If you selected investment product, do you think it is a good 
investment? _____ 
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c. None of the above 
d. I don’t know 
 
32. What do you think of insurance providers in general? Select all that apply. 
a. They provide a useful service 
b. They are not trustworthy 
c. Purchasing their products implies a fear and lack of faith in God 
d. Their products are not useful to me – I am self-reliant and protect my 
family against risk in other ways 
i. If yes, please specify ___________  (e.g., family support) 
e. I don’t know 
 
33. In the past three years, have you faced a sudden shock to your consumption 
(e.g., crop failure, family illness)?      
a. Yes   
i. What was it? ____________ 
ii. When was it? 
iii. 1 month ago 
iv. 3 months ago 
v. 6 months ago 
vi. 1 year ago 
vii. 2 years ago 
viii. 3 year ago 
ix. What did you do to get by? 
x. Sold assets (e.g., gold, jewellery, animals) 
xi. Took a child out of school  
xii. Relied on savings 
xiii. Received help from relatives/neighbours 
xiv. Worked more 
xv. Took out large loans  
xvi. Received help from the government 
xvii. Other (specify) ___________ 
b. No 
    
34. What is your experience with the following insurance products? 
Product Heard of  Offered  Bought 
If not bought, 
why not? 
Weather insurance in a loan 
Weather insurance a stand-alone 
product 
    
Crop insurance from government 
Crop insurance from private sector 
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Phase 7: Payment 
 
We are now going to play the black and white stone game.  You chose the following 
gamble: ____ 
 
Give participant pouch with black and white stone. 
 
You selected the _____ stone. This means you will be paid _______ if the 
selected round for payment is the black and white stone game. 
 
We are now going to randomly choose one of the rounds that you played in either the 
black and white game, the blue game or the red game to determine your payout. In this 
bag are tokens labelled for each round of each game. Please select a token to determine 
your payout. 
 
You selected round ____  You will be paid ____ for your participation today. 
 
This is the end of the survey. Thanks for participating! 
 
 
Question for the interviewer: What was the general level of understanding of the 
participant?  
a. Participant understood everything perfectly 
b. Participant mostly understood 
c. Participant had some minor struggles 
d. Participant had major struggles and did not really understand 
 
Question for the interviewer: Any additional comments __________ 
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Appendix II- Binswanger lottery 
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Appendix III- Additional tables  
 
Table A1.1 Fertiliser preferences (in %) 
 
 
Table A1.2 Risk aversion parameters 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.3 Percentage of groups that all select the same investment 
 
  
(1)                    
Low-risk 
fertiliser
(2)                    
Average-risk 
fertiliser
(3)                     
High-risk 
fertiliser
Mean            
investment 
choice
Individual Perfect (IP) 24.68 22.94 52.38 2.28
Group Perfect (GP) 30.96 25.89 43.15 2.12
Group Imperfect (GI) 25.52 18.83 55.65 2.30
All Farmers 26.84 22.34 50.82 2.24
Gamble Risk level
a 50 50 Extreme ∞ 7.51 8 5.31
b 45 95 Severe 7.51 1.74 4.625 6.25
c 40 120 Intermediate 1.74 0.812 1.276 14.69
d 35 125 Inefficient 0.920 11.25
e 30 150 Moderate 0.812 0.316 0.564 23.75
f 20 160 Inefficient 0.361 11.88
g 10 190 Slight to neutral 0.316 0 0.158 17.19
h 0 200 Neutral to Negative 0 to -∞ 0 9.38
I don't know 0 0 Observation dropped 0.31
Note: Draws on Binswanger (1980) and Stein & Tobacman (2011)
Approximate Coefficient of Partial Risk Aversion (CPRA)
Payoffs
% of 
respondents
Upper 
bound
Lower 
bound
White 
(high)
Black 
(low)
Coefficient 
used for 
regressions
Round 1 Round 2 All Rounds
Individual Perfect (IP) 30.93 45.76 37.66
Group Perfect (GP) 30.19 51.79 39.59
Group Imperfect (GI) 18.10 25.00 23.85
Total 26.02 39.57 33.28
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Table A1.4 Dispersion within the group 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.5 Transfers given 
 
 
  
Individual 
Perfect             
(IP)
Group   
Perfect     
(GP)
Group 
Imperfect 
(GI) Total
Average std. dev. of investment choices within group 0.61 0.47 0.67 0.59
(0.51) (0.44) (0.44) (0.47)
Average std. dev. of risk preferences within group 1.36 1.15 1.31 1.27
(1.46) (1.39) (1.56) (1.48)
Average std. dev. of earnings within group 3,596.98  4,543.26  3,924.11  3,994.24  
(3,131.55) (4,781.22) (4,460.78) (4,172.00)
Average transfer (in Rs) % insured        
Individual Perfect (IP) 900.4 7.5%
(2,453.07) (4.79)
Group Perfect (GP) 1,523.4                       8.0%
(3,498.20) (0.22)
Group Imperfect (GI) 913.3 4.7%
(3,359.48) (0.16)
Total 1,088.4                       6.6%
(3,132.26) (0.19)
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Table A1.6 Impact of group insurance and information access on investment 
choice: logit and LPM 
Treatment effects relative to base category: Individual Perfect (IP) 
Dependent variable:
(1) Logit (2) Logit (3) OLS (4) OLS
Group Perfect (GP) -0.65* -0.49 -0.22** -0.18
(0.33) (0.32) (0.11) (0.11)
Group Imperfect (GI) -0.04 0.36 -0.07 0.07
(0.31) (0.36) (0.09) (0.10)
GP*Risk Aversion -0.15 -0.03
(0.15) (0.03)
GI*Risk Aversion -0.37** -0.12***
(0.15) (0.03)
Risk Aversion 0.01 0.20* 0.00 0.06***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 2.43 1.38 1.50* 1.78**
(3.25) (3.15) (0.76) (0.75)
Observations 667 667 667 667
R-squared 0.279 0.291
Wald 147.5 170.4 . .
Pseudo R-squared 0.243 0.252 . .
P-value of test GP = GI4 0.048 0.037 0.166 0.128
Note 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 4: Interaction terms are included in relevant specifications
Note 5: Dependent variable = 0 if the farmer adopts low-risk or average-risk fertiliser and 1 if the 
farmer adopts high-risk fertiliser.
Note 6: Dependent variable = 1 if the farmer adopts low-risk fertiliser, 2 if the farmer adopts 
average-risk fertiliser and 3 if the farmer adopts high-risk fertiliser.
Investment Dummy (0-1)5 Investment Choice (1-2-3)6
Note 1: Other controls are education, caste, age, gender, assets, landowner status, exposure to a 
shock in the last three years, playing the investment or take-up game first, round number, preference 
for high returns, influence from group members, receiving news from TV, receiving news from the 
newspaper, same caste and choosing an inefficient risk aversion lottery (omitted from table).
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
  
Table A2.1 Dependent variable: WTP (in Rs) 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.2 Risk aversion parameters 
 
 
 
  
Median
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 All Rounds All Rounds
No Transfer    
(NT)
2,057 2,290 2,198 2,124 2,764 2,400 2,000 3,133 2,181        2,100         
Transfer            
(T)
1,798 2,233 2,072 2,500 2,950 3,450 no obs. no obs. 2,008        2,200         
All Farmers 1,930 2,265 2,142 2,254 2,829 2,820 2,000 3,133 2,102        2,200         
Mean
Gamble Risk level
a 50 50 Extreme ∞ 7.51 8 5.82
b 45 95 Severe 7.51 1.74 4.625 5.48
c 40 120 Intermediate 1.74 0.812 1.276 12.33
d 35 125 Inefficient 0.920 11.30
e 30 150 Moderate 0.812 0.316 0.564 22.60
f 20 160 Inefficient 0.361 13.01
g 10 190 Slight to neutral 0.316 0 0.158 20.55
h 0 200 Neutral to Negative 0 to -∞ 0 8.22
I don't know 0 0 Observations dropped 0.68
Note: Draws on Binswanger (1980) and Stein & Tobacman (2011)
Approximate Coefficient of Partial Risk Aversion (CPRA)
Payoffs Coefficient 
used for 
regressions
% of 
respondents
Upper 
bound
Lower 
bound
White 
(high)
Black 
(low)
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Table A2.3 OLS regressions excluding risk aversion categories D & F 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.4 Dispersion within the group 
 
 
 
Table A2.5 Occurrence of drought by round (in %) 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfer (T) -140.64 -144.49 -722.32** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.27***
(189.39) (162.75) (289.95) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
T*Risk Aversion 55.15 0.02*
(46.52) (0.01)
T*Plot size 96.08** 0.02*
(47.53) (0.01)
Risk Aversion 38.73* 10.37 0.01** 0.00
(21.52) (31.52) (0.00) (0.00)
Plot size 2.03 -43.49 0.00 0.00
(24.72) (27.25) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2,158.40*** 2,943.90*** 3,204.43*** 0.99*** 1.09*** 1.13***
(117.76) (598.01) (614.50) (0.01) (0.19) (0.20)
Observations 435 435 435 435 435 435
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
R-squared 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.13
Note 2: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in ( ).
Note 3: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note 1: The other controls are gender, same caste, round number, education, religion, and playing 
the investment game/take-up game first (omitted from the table).
WTP Dichotomous variable = 1 if WTP>0
No Transfer 
(NT)
Transfer      
(T)
All Farmers
Average standard deviation of WTP within group 544.46 796.06 658.95
(469.11) (604.43) (548.97)
Average standard deviation of WTP>0 within group 0.03 0.16 0.09
(0.12) (0.26) (0.21)
Average standard deviation of risk preferences within group 1.24 1.43 1.33
(1.53) (1.60) (1.56)
Average standard deviation of earnings within group 2,751.68      5,284.79      3,904.31        
(1,344.60) (5,101.17) (3,793.87)
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 All Rounds
No Transfer (NT) 18.2 18.1 19.5 29.4 45.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4
Transfer (T) 26.8 29.9 9.4 11.1 50.0 0.0 no obs. no obs. 25.2
All Farmers 22.4 23.3 15.1 23.1 47.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1
